Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements in Securities Fraud Disputes by Lusardi, Robert A
Western New England University School of Law
Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications
1989
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements in
Securities Fraud Disputes
Robert A. Lusardi
Western New England University School of Law, rlusardi@law.wne.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/facschol
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Western New England University
School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
41 Rutgers L. Rev. 541 (1989)
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION 





Robert A. Lusardi* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is always a risk of conflict between an investor and his 
stockbroker. This conflict is particularly real when the investor 
has suffered a large loss, which he frequently believes to be the 
result of malfeasance or misfeasance on the part of the broker. 
Upon hearing the tale of the client-investor, an attorney may rec­
ognize a variety of potential claims against the broker and his 
firm. These claims may include violations of section 12(2) of the 
Securities Act of 1933;1 section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934;2 the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act 
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; A.B., Colgate Univer­
sity, 1968; J.D., Boston College, 1971. 
1. 	 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). Section 12(2) provides: 

Any person who­
(2) offers or sells a security ... by the use of any means or instruments of 
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by 
means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue state­
ment of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), 
and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the 
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, 
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue 
either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the 
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of 
any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if 
he no longer owns the security. 
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facil­
ity of any national securities exchange­
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
541 
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("RICO");3 and state law blue sky, fraud and breach of contract 
claims.· On first glance the attorney may conclude that these 
claims should be joined in a single action to be filed in federal 
court. The claims under federal statutes have a clear jurisdic­
tional base;1i the state law claims may be swept into federal court 
under diversity jurisdiction,S or if that is unavailable, the state 
law claims may be brought under pendent jurisdiction.7 Upon fur­
ther examination, however, the attorney may discover that when 
the client-investor opened his account with the broker, he entered 
into a customer's agreement which provided that in the event of 
any controversy arising out of the broker-investor relationship, 
the matter was to be submitted to arbitration.8 
Pursuant to this provision the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] adopted Rule Q 
lOb-5 which provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facil­
ity of any national securities exchange, 
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1985). Under these provisions, courts have implied private rights of 
action ("Rule 10b-5 claims"). E.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 
(1983); Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 
13 n.9 (1971). A brief history of the early development of the concept of implied rights is 
set out in L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1057-58 (1983). 
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). Section 1962(c) provides: 
(c) it shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter­
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, 
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter­
prise's affairs through 8 pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful 
debt. 
Any person injured by a violation of this section may sue the person causing the injury in 
federal court for treble damages and attorney's fees. [d. § 1964(c). 
4. See, e.g., Uniform Securities Act § 101. 
5. Under the Securities Act of 1933, jurisdiction is proper in state or federal court, and 
if the action is brought in state court it is not removable. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982). 
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, there is exclusive jurisdiction in the federal 
district courts. [d. § 78aa. 
Under RICO there is concurrent jurisdiction in the federal district court. 18 U.S.C. § 
1964 (1982). 
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982). 
7. E.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
8. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-208 (1982), does not define the 
term "arbitration," but one district court defined it as follows: 
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The existence of such a pre-dispute arbitration clause,9 not­
withstanding its intent to avoid litigation, has led to extensive lit­
igation to resolve whether the client-investor can be required to 
arbitrate claims that he may have against the broker.lo The his­
torical reluctance on the part of courts to enforce arbitration 
agreementsll was changed by Congress when it adopted the Fed-
Arbitration is a creature of contract, a device of the parties rather than the 
judicial process. If the parties have agreed to submit a dispute for a decision by 
a third party, they have agreed to arbitration. The arbitrator's decision need not 
be binding in the same sense that a judicial decision needs to be to satisfy the 
constitutional requirement of a justiciable case or controversy. 
AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
9. The Securities Industry Association has adopted an arbitration clause which reads: 
It is understood that the following agreement to arbitrate does not constitute 
a waiver of the right to seek a judicial forum where such a waiver would be void 
under the federal securities law. 
The undersigned agrees, and by carrying an account for the undersigned you 
agree, that except as inconsistent with the foregoing sentence, all controversies 
which may arise between us concerning any transaction or the construction, per­
formance or breach of this or any other agreement between us, whether entered 
into prior, on or subsequent to the date hereof, shall be determined by 
arbitration. 
[July-Dec.] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1860 (Oct. 18, 1985). 
Another example of a customer's arbitration agreement is set out in 5 A. SOMMER. SE­
CURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES-TRANSACTIONS-LITIGATION ch. 118, app. A (1988) [hereinafter 
SOMMER]. 
It should be noted that not all customers sign these agreements. Some brokerage houses 
only require them for margin or option accounts and not for cash customers. SOMMER, 
supra, at § 118.02[4]. The SEC staff has reported to the Commission that a survey it had 
conducted of industry practices indicated that approximately 39 percent of cash accounts 
are covered by arbitration clauses, but that 99.5-99.6 percent of margin and option ac­
counts are covered by such clauses. [Jan.-June] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1053 
(July 8, 1988). Concern that brokerage firms may require the signing of an arbitration 
agreement as a condition of doing business has led to a bill being introduced in Congress 
which, among other things, would ban mandatory arbitration agreements. Id. at 838, 850, 
1053-54 (referring to H.R. 4960, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988». The SEC has decided to 
oppose any legislation on this issue until it further studies the issue. Id. at 1053. 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has adopted regulations effective January 1, 1989, 
that will ban mandatory arbitration between brokers and investors; other states are con­
sidering similar bans. [July-Dec.] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1436 (Sept. 23, 
1988). The Massachusetts regulations were recently struck down by a federal district 
court. Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 1988, at B8, col. 3. 
10. E.g., Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Wilko v. Swan, 346 
U.S. 427 (1953); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1985). Of course, while 
my scenario suggests dealings between brokers and their clients, the same issues could 
arise in any setting in which there is a contract with a pre-dispute arbitration clause and a 
legal dispute arising out of the contract. See, e.g., State Establishment for Agric. Product 
Trading v. Wesermunde, 770 F.2d 987 (11th Cir. 1985) (commercial shipping arbitration). 
11. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 220 n.6 (citing the House Report on the Federal Arbitration Act, 
H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1924». 
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eral Arbitration Actlll ("Arbitration Act") in which it indicated a 
strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. IS In some instances, 
however, courts have refused to enforce these agreements as to 
statutorily based causes of action when it is determined that Con­
gress has indicated, implicitly or explicitly, that the plaintiff is 
entitled to a judicial determination of his or her rights. 1. The res­
olution of the question of the arbitrability of a claim has resulted 
in a balancing of competing interests to determine when an arbi­
tration agreement should be enforced. 16 
In addressing the issue of the enforcement of arbitration agree­
ments primary questions remain unanswered: first, which securi~ 
ties claims should be subject to pre-dispute arbitration agree­
ments; and second, whether there exists a continuing justification 
for exempting any of these claims from arbitration. The United 
States Supreme Court has begun to address these questions in 
recent years, and it recently clarified its position in Shearson/ 
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon. I6 
Initially, this article seeks to explain the context in which these 
disputes arise, and to suggest the reasons why plaintiffs strongly 
oppose the arbitration of claims in this area. It then reviews the 
Arbitration Act, and the rationale for establishing exceptions to 
the general policy of enforcing arbitration. Next, it considers the 
appropriateness of the analysis used in deciding whether to send 
cases to arbitration, and the problems which have arisen as a re­
sult of those decisions. Finally, it recommends changes in the ar­
bitration process to resolve these problems and to better allow for 
the arbitration of securities disputes. 
12. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-208 (1982) (formerly the United States Arbitration Act). 
13. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Congo 1st Sess. (1924). ("The purpose of this bill is to make 
valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration. . . . Arbitration agreements are purely 
matters of contract and the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party live 
up to his agreement .... An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as 
other contracts, where it belongs."). 
14. E.g., Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-38 (recognizing that Congress "has enacted the Securi­
ties Act to protect the rights of investors and has forbidden a waiver of any of those 
rights" and concluding that "the intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities is 
better carried out by holding invalid such an agreement for arbitration of issues arising 
under the [Securities) Act"); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 436-38 (2d Cir.), cert. de­
nied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977). 
15. See, e.g., Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438; Perot, 548 F.2d at 438. 
16. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). 
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II. OPPOSITION TO ARBITRATION 
In order to understand the issues raised concerning the arbi­
trability of securities disputes, it is appropriate to first consider 
the reasons for conflict between the parties as to whether a claim 
should be sent to arbitration. On its face it would seem that arbi­
tration is a method of dispute resolution that benefits both par­
ties, since it is a fast and relatively inexpensive means to resolve 
claims.17 Plaintiffs, however, frequently oppose arbitration; in 
plaintiffs' view, the speed and low cost of arbitration is out­
weighed by the existence of several factors. 
First, arbitration is viewed as being incapable of handling com­
plex legal disputes because of the informal nature of the process, 
and because arbitrators are not as qualified as judges to handle 
the critical decisions required in a securities case. IS Second, the 
absence of a significant discovery system in arbitration places a 
plaintiff at a disadvantage in attempting to ferret out the detailed 
information necessary to establish a claim. IS Third, the informal­
ity of the arbitration process makes it difficult for the courts to 
supervise the propriety of the decision-making process; there is 
no requirement that a record be kept of the proceedings, or that 
the arbitrator's decision state the reasons for the decision.20 
Fourth, since the arbitration process is regulated by the securities 
industry, plaintiffs question the propriety of persons involved 
with the securities industry deciding cases which effectively oper­
ate to regulate that industry.21 Finally, the arbitration of claims 
may limit the plaintiffs right to obtain punitive damages under 
state law.22 At this stage, it is sufficient to accept these objections 
17. Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, 71 A.B.A. J. 78, 80 (1985). 
18. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953). 
19. Katsoris, Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 287 
n.52 (1984) ("Generally, pre-trial discovery procedures, such as bills of particulars, inter­
rogatories, depositions, and notices to produce documents for inspection . . . 'focus the 
dispute by bringing to light the pertinent differences before trial.'" (citing Goldstein, Is­
sue of Pretrial Discovery, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1979, at D4, col. 1)). 
20. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436. 
21. Katsoris, supra note 19, at 309-11. See also Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen­
ner &Smith, Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d 899, 903, 135 Cal. Rptr. 26, 28 (Ct. App. 1976); Krause, 
Securities Litigation: The Unsolved Problem of Predispute Arbitration Agreements for 
Pendent Claims, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 693, 720 (1980). 
22. [July-Dec.] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 1917 (Dec. 7, 1984) (reporting a 
colloquy between Justice Brennan and the attorney for the defendant during the oral ar­
gument in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), in which it was as­
serted that plaintiffs seek to avoid arbitration since arbitrators cannot award punitive 
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to arbitration. With these objections in mind, the development of 
the law concerning arbitration of securities disputes, and the re­
cent judicial reconsideration of these principles can be examined. 
III. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
Congress adopted the Arbitration Act in 1925 with the specific 
purpose of overriding the reluctance of courts to enforce arbitra­
tion agreements.2S Congress recognized that courts had histori­
cally viewed the arbitration process with hostility and suspicion. 
In an effort to reduce the delay and expense parties faced in the 
litigation process, Congress required the enforcement of arbitra­
tion agreements to the same extent as other contracts in matters 
that related to interstate commerce and admiralty.24 Courts have 
enforced the requirements of the Arbitration Act as a matter of 
substantive law in both federal2l! and state courts.26 While strong 
arguments have been made that the statute was only intended as 
a procedural device to require federal courts to enforce these 
agreements,27 judicial interpretations of the statute have gone far 
damages under New York law). While New York law, which often controls state law claims 
in these cases, prohibits an arbitrator from granting punitive damages, Garrity v. Lyle 
Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976), it has been argued 
that, under the Arbitration Act and recent Supreme Court decisions, a federal court en­
forcing an arbitration award should not apply the New York rule. Hirshman, The Second 
Arbitration Trilogy; The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1360-63 
(1985); see Ehrich v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 559, 565 (D.S.D. 1987) 
(upholding an arbitration award of punitive damages and saying that Garrity was inappli­
cable because federal law applied). 
The importance of punitive damages is illustrated by a recent case in Sioux Falls, South 
Dakota, in which a jury entered an award against a broker of $20,000 in compensatory 
damages and $2.25 million in punitive damages. Wall St. J., May 5, 1987, at 20, col. 2. 
23. 	The House report stated the purpose of the Arbitration Act as follows: 

The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law. Some 

centuries ago, because of the jealousy.of the English courts for their own juris­
_ 	 diction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground 

that the courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This jealousy sur­

vived for so Ion [sic] a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the 

English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts. 

H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924). 
24. Id. at 1. The adoption of this statute ultimately led to a series of problems relating 
to Congress's power to legislate in this area. An interesting analysis of these problems is 
set out in Hirshman, supra note 22. 
25. E.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Robert 
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959). 
26. 	E.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
27. Id. at 25-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Perry v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520, 2528 (1987) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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beyond this, leading to the federalization of the law of 
arbitration.28 
Given the strong federal policy established under the Arbitra­
tion Act, the issue arose as to whether there were any situations 
in which competing federal interests would restrict the enforce­
ment of arbitration agreements. This issue of balancing compet­
ing federal interests' presented itself clearly in the case of Wilko v. 
Swan.29 
A. The Wilko Decision 
In Wilko, the Supreme Court was faced with a claim pursuant 
to section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act").3o 
A brokerage firm customer filed suit, alleging that he had lost 
money in a stock transaction due to misrepresentations by the 
firm.31 The defendants moved for a stay pending arbitration in 
accordance with the parties' pre-dispute agreement.32 The district 
court denied the application of the stay as a deprivation of the 
plaintiffs right to a judicial remedy under the Securities Act.33 
The court of appeals reversed and the stay was granted.34 
The Supreme Court was faced with the problem of balancing 
the Arbitration Act's policy of enforcing arbitration agreements 
against the grant of a judicial remedy under the Securities Act. It 
was claimed that Congress specifically sought to protect this judi­
cial remedy by the inclusion of a provision in section 14 of the 
Securities Act which states: "Any condition, stipulation, or provi­
sion binding any person acquiring any security to waive compli­
arice with any provision of this subchapter or the rules and regu­
28. Hirshman, supra note 22, at 1306-08. Professor Hirshman explains that "the Su­
preme Court established the Arbitration Act as the governing law in state courts and indi­
cated that issues of arbitrability would be decided as a matter of federal law in accordance 
with the federal policy favoring arbitration." [d. at 1307. 
29. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
30. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). See supra note 1. 
31. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428-29. The plaintiff claimed that his brokerage firm induced 
him to purchase shares in a corporation on speculation that it would be bought out at a 
price above the market price. The plaintiff alleged that he was not told that an insider of 
the corporation was selling shares of the corporation, and further alleged that he had pur­
chased some or all of the insider's shares. When the merger did not occur the plaintiff sold 
his shares at a loss. 
32. The arbitration clause was included in the margin agreement that had been exe­
cuted by the parties. [d. 
33. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75 (S.D. N.Y. 1952). 
34. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953). 
548 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:541 
lations of the Commission shall be void."sli The plaintiff asserted 
that a pre-dispute agreement that provides for the arbitration of 
any disputes constitutes a "waiver" of the statutorily granted 
right to assert a restitution-like claim under section 12(2) of the 
Securities Act in a federal court.S8 The plaintiff argued that the 
arbitration provision should therefore be voided, and the case 
should continue in federal court, which would' provide the plain­
tiff greater protection than would an informal arbitration 
proceeding.87 
The Supreme Court concluded that "the right to select a judi­
cial forum is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived under 
section 14 of the Securities Act."88 The Court reasoned that pur­
chasers of securities were at a substantial informational disadvan­
tage in dealing with issuers and dealers in securities transactions, 
and that Congress therefore sought to give them some protection 
by providing them with a wider choice of forums to protect their 
interests.89 In addition, the Court viewed arbitration as an inap­
propriate mechanism for the resolution of disputes involving com­
plex "legal" questions that an arbitrator would be ill-prepared to 
decide.40 This was of special concern to the Court because there 
was very limited judicial review of the arbitrator's decision,41 and 
no requirement of a written record or decision.42 The Court 
viewed this limited judicial review as inconsistent with the inten­
tion of Congress, as expressed in the Securities Act, to provide 
judicial supervision of the remedy provided to plaintiffs in this 
area.48 In light of these concerns, the Court balanced what it per­
ceived to be the conflicting policies of arbitration and investor 
protection, and concluded that arbitration agreements are invalid 
35. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). 
36. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432-33. 
37. [d. 
38. [d. at 435 ("The security buyer has a wider choice of courts and venue. He thus 
surrenders one of the advantages the Act gives him and surrenders it at a time when he is 
less able to judge the weight of the handicap the Securities Act places upon his 
adversary."). 
39. [d. 
40. [d. at 435-37. 
41. [d. at 436-37 (stating that if the submission to the arbitrator was "unrestricted" the 
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as a method to resolve issues arising under the Securities Act.44 
In coming to its conclusion, the majority showed a substantial 
concern for the investor protections provided by Congress under 
the Securities Act, as well as an uneasiness about the use of arbi­
tration in contexts other than the standard commercial transac­
tions which involve the "quality of a commodity or the amount of 
money due under a contract."u This uneasiness was compounded 
by the Court's determination to narrowly view the role of the ju­
diciary in the submission to arbitration and in the review of the 
arbitrator's decision under the Arbitration Act. The Court con­
cluded that unless the parties' arbitration agreement provides 
otherwise, the Arbitration Act prohibits all judicial review of legal 
interpretations by the arbitrator, absent a "manifest disregard" of 
the law.46 This restrictive view of judicial review, while not neces-' 
sary to its holding,·n was critical to its decision. The Court re­
garded judicial supervision as central to Congress's design in the 
adoption of the Securities Act. The limited nature of judicial su­
pervision, as perceived by the Court in the context of arbitration 
44. [d. at 438 ("Recognizing the advantages that prior agreements for arbitration may 
provide for the solution of commercial controversies, we decide that the intention of Con­
gress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid such an 
agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the [Securities) Act."). 
45. [d. at 435 (footnote omitted). 
46. 	 [d. at 436-37. Specifically, section 10 of the Arbitration Act provides: 

In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district 

wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the 

application of any party to the arbitration­
. (a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means. 
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or ei­
ther of them. 
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone 
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence perti­
nent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the 
rights of any party have been prejudiced. 
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed 
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted 
was not made. 
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement re­
quired the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, 
direct a rehearing by the arbitrators. 
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982). 
47. Justice Jackson concurred in the majority opinion on the question of whether the 
Securities Act prohibited a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate, but he thought it unneces­
sary to decide whether the Arbitration Act would prevent judicial review of an arbitrator's 
interpretation of the law. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438-39 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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agreements, tipped the balance in favor of non-waiveability.48 
In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter focused on the question of 
judicial supervision and review of the arbitrator's decision.49 He 
reasoned that an arbitrator is capable of and required to decide 
cases under section 12(2), and that it is proper for courts to re­
view those decisions to insure compliance with the law.lio Justice 
Frankfurter argued that, in order to encourage the speedy and 
economical resolution of disputes which Congress had intended 
under the Arbitration Act, the Court should imply the power to 
require sufficient formality in the proceedings so that a court 
could review the arbitration decision to insure compliance with 
the law in the substantive decision. iiI Based on this analysis, he 
saw no reason why the arbitration agreement should not be en­
forced, as long as it was freely agreed to by the parties. li2 
48. [d. at 437. 
49. [d. at 439-40 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
50. [d. 
51. [d. Justice Frankfurter stated: 
Arbitrators may not disregard the law. Specifically they are, as Chief Judge 
Swan pointed out, "bound to decide in accordance with the provisions of section 
12(2)." On this we are all agreed. It is suggested, however, that there is no effec­
tive way of assuring obedience by the arbitrators to the governing law. But since 
their failure to observe this law "would. . . constitute grounds for vacating the 
award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act," ... appropriate 
means for judicial scrutiny must be implied in the form of some record or opin­
ion, however informal, whereby such compliance will appear, or want of it will 
upset the award. 
[d. at 440. See infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
52. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The question of whether the 
contract was freely entered into or whether there was fraud involved in entering into the 
contract would go to arbitration, unless the parties had otherwise agreed. Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967). The question of whether 
the clause providing for arbitration was freely given or obtained by fraud, would be re­
solved by the court. [d.; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 
391, 398 (5th Cir. 1981). If the claim of fraud relates both to the arbitration agreement and 
the entire agreement, it has been argued by at least one district court that the court must 
resolve the issue of fraud in entering the arbitration agreement. Rush v. Oppenheimer & 
Co., Inc., 681 F. Supp. 1045, 1048-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Contra Schacht v. Beacon Ins. Co., 
742 F.2d 386, 389-90 (7th Cir. 1984) (taking the position that a claim of fraud in the in­
ducement should be decided by a court only when it goes solely to the arbitration clause, 
and not to the entire contract). 
The basis for this distinction is section 4 of the Arbitration Act which provides that if a 
party refuses to arbitrate under an agreement, the other party may sue in the federal 
district court to compel arbitration. If the court is "satisfied that the making of the agree­
ment for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make 
an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). Under the statute, the agreement to arbitrate is to be 
enforced "save on such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con­
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It is clear that Wilko was premised only in part on the special 
nature of the rights provided to investors under the Securities 
Act. Going beyond the special'nature of those rights, the majority 
was strongly influenced by the perceived inability of the arbitra­
tion system to provide a consistently effective decision-making 
process for the resolution of these claims. The Court was con­
cerned that once the matter was turned over to arbitration there 
was no effective means of judicial control to insure that the arbi­
trator was properly performing his job in resolving disputes. 
Taking heed of the Wilko Court's concern about the arbitration 
system, lower federal courts determined that they would not en­
force pre-dispute arbitration agreements in a number of situa­
tions.53 In these cases, the courts focused less on the special ele­
ments of the claim created by Congress and the broad· 
jurisdictional choices provided to plaintiffs, and instead looked at 
whether the arbitration clause would prevent the plaintiff from 
exercising an important right to a federal forum. 54 In no area of 
law was this more fully realized than in claims implied under 
Rule 10b-5. 
B. Rule lOb-5 Claims 
For the next twenty-two years courts took a broad view of 
Wilko, and uniformly decided not to send Rule 10b-5 claims to 
arbitration.55 The primary focus of those opinions was the exis­
tract." 9 u.s.C. § 2 (1982). More than an allegation of impropriety is necessary to raise an 
issue which a court will review since there is nothing inherently wrong with standardized 
contracts. Boyd v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 611 F. Supp. 218, 220-21 (S.D. 
Fla. 1985). Moreover, it is clear that any questions concerning the scope of arbitration are 
to be resolved in favor of arbitrability. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); Austin Mun. Sec. v. Nafl Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 757 
F.2d 676, 696 (5th Cir. 1985). 
53. E.g., Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 334-37 (5th Cir. 1981) (state claims 
which are intertwined with non-arbitrable federal claims); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 
436-38 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977) (Rule 10b-5 claim); American Safety 
Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 825-28 (2d Cir. 1968) (antitrust claim); 
S.A. Mineracao de Trindade Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566, 574-76 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983) (RICO). 
54. Thus, in the antitrust area, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was con­
cerned about the public interest sought to be protected by the Sherman Act, and that 
Congress must have ,wanted those "private attorney-general" actions to be decided by a 
federal court. American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 
1968). 
55. The uniform treatment of Rule lOb-5 claims is best shown by the number of cases 
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 
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tence of section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
("Exchange Act")G6 which, in a fashion similar to the language of 
section 14 of the Securities Act,G7 prohibits the enforcement of 
any provision which purports to waive compliance with the Act. 
Largely based on this provision, courts concluded that the Wilko 
analysis should be applied to these cases.G6 No strong attempt was 
made to evaluate the differences between the two categories of 
cases;1!9 instead, the courts focused on the federal interest in pro­
(1985), in which the defendants did not request arbitration of Rule 10b-5 claims when 
requesting arbitration of state law claims. In Byrd. itself, the Supreme Court declined to 
address the question of whether Wilko precluded arbitration agreements with regard to 
these federal claims because the defendant had failed to seek to compel arbitration of the 
Rule 10b-5 claim in the district court. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 215-16 n.1; Dimenstien v. White­
man, 759 F.2d 1514, 1516 n.2 (11th Cir. 1985). See supra note 2. 
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1982) ("Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person 
to waive compliance with any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, 
or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."). 
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). See supra text accompanying note 35. 
58. E.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979). The court 
stated: 
As to the federal claims . . . Wilko ... precludes compelling Mansbach to 
submit the matter to arbitration. The arbitration agreement is overridden by the 
anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws. While Wilko arose under 
the Securities Act of 1933, its holding and rationale are equally applicable to 
cases arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
[d. at 1030; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827 (10th 
Cir. 1979); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536 (3d Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1977). 
59. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated: 
We need not review here the fundamental and important differences between 
litigation in a court and arbitration. It is enough to say that the Supreme Court 
found prospective waivers of the right to judicial trial and review to be inconsis­
tent with Congress' overriding concern for the protection of investors . . . . As 
Merrill Lynch points out, a "colorable argument" can be made that Wilko v. 
Swan should not apply to arbitration of judicially implied causes of action under 
the 1934 Act. We are not, however, persuaded that either the differences be­
tween the rights granted in the 1933 and 1934 Acts or any consideration of pol­
icy warrant such a distinction. 
Ayres, 538 F.2d at 536 (footnotes omitted). It is interesting to note that while the courts 
were always very careful to avoid what was described as the "shrill cry against arbitra­
tion," Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 
(1977), the bottom line of the decisions was that the courts viewed arbitration with a lin­
gering suspicion that it was not capable of handling complex legal questions, and that it 
would therefore be inappropriate to apply the Arbitration Act as a matter of policy. 
In Ayres, the court noted that Congress had at least suggested support for the view that 
Wilko applied to Rule 10b-5 claims. Ayres, 538 F.2d at 537. This view was based on a 
reference to the question in the legislative history to Securities Act Amendments of 1975. 
H.R. Rep. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 321, 342. That legislative history is susceptible to a variety of interpretations, see 
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tecting investors, which is present in all of the securities laws, and 
concluded that those interests would best be protected by provid­
ing a judicial forum. 
In opposition to this position, it was suggested that a "colorable 
argument" could be made that the differences between claims 
under section 12(2) and Rule lOb-5 were significant enough to 
justify different results on the issue of arbitration.60 This reason­
ing provided the basis for the one remaining argument that Rule 
10b-5 claims were arbitrable.61 Without evaluating the validity of 
this argument at this point,62 there are a number of distinctions 
between section 12(2) claims and Rule lOb-5 claims which could 
provide a basis for different treatment. First, Rule 10b-5 actions 
have not been created by Congress as a provision of the Exchange 
Act, but have been implied by courts from the general prohibition 
language of the statute.63 Since Congress did not create the cause 
of action, it can be argued that it never exempted this action from 
its general policy in favor of arbitration under the Arbritation 
Act.64 Second, because neither the Exchange Act nor the rules 
thereunder create a right of action by their terms, it can be ar­
gued that a court cannot rely on the language of section 29, which 
voids agreements that waive compliance with the Exchange Act, 
or rules thereunder.611 Third, because Rule lOb-5 actions are more 
infra text accompanying notes 111-13, and was specifically addressed by the Supreme 
Court in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). See infra 
note 155. 
60. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513 (1974); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 224 (1985) (White, J., concurring). 
61. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2346-47 (1987) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
62. Justice Blackmun suggested in McMahon that the majority's failure to address this 
"colorable argument" relegated it "to its proper place in the graveyard of ideas." [d. at 
2347 n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See infra text accompa­
nying notes 120-43 for an analysis of the distinctions between the claims. 
63. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). 
64. See, e.g., Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513-14. This dicta in Scherk was not followed by the 
lower courts, which felt bound by the strong federal policies protecting investors. Scherk 
was distinguished on the ground that the case was decided on the principles of interna­
tional comity. E.g., Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 
831, 833-35 (7th Cir. 1977); Sibley v.' Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976). 
65. See, e.g., Byrd, 470 U.S. at 224-25 (1985) (White, J., concurring). Contra Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827 (10th Cir. 1978), where 
the court stated: "Thus through § 29(a), Congress carried the policy contained in § 14 of 
the 1933 Act into the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. True it is not a word for word 
replica, but it explicitly includes any rule or regulation thereunder which refers to 'any 
provision of this chapter.' " [d. 
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similar to common law actions in their elements than actions 
under section 12(2) and therefore more easily dealt with by an 
arbitrator, it can be argued that courts need not show as much 
concern for Rule lOb-5 actions as for actions under section 
12(2).66 
During the period following Wilko, the Securities and Ex­
change Commission ("SEC") supported the view in opposition to 
arbitration of securities claims.67 In 1983, the SEC took the fur­
ther step of attempting to regulate broker agreements concerning 
arbitration by adopting Rule 15c2-2.66 Rule 15c2-2 declared it a 
fraudulent act for a broker or dealer to enter into a pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement with a public customer which purported to 
apply to disputes arising under the federal securities laws. 
In adopting Rule 15c2-2, the SEC pointed out its long support 
for the concept of arbitration of securities disputes as an alterna­
tive to litigation, but not when it was based on an agreement be­
tween brokers and their customers to arbitrate future disputes.69 
The SEC took the position that Wilko must be read to bar all 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements for all federal claims arising 
under statutes that have anti-waiver provisions similar to that in 
the Securities Act.70 While the language of Rule 15c2-2 gave the 
impression that it was a deceptive act to include an arbitration 
clause in a customer's agreement, the purpose of Rule 15c2-2 was 
to insure that public customers were not deceived into believing 
that they had waived their right to a judicial resolution of a fed­
eral securities claim, which would be invalid under the Wilko 
66. See, e.g., Byrd, 470 U.S. at 224-25. 
67. Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, [1979] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) " 82,122 (July 2, 
1979). 
68. Rule 15c2-2 provided in pertinent part: 
(a) It shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice for a bro­
ker or dealer to enter into an agreement with any public customer which pur­
ports to bind the customer to the arbitration of future disputes between them 
arising under the federal securities laws or to have in effect such an agreement, 
pursuant to which it effects transactions with or for a customer. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.15C2-2 (1985). This rule was rescinded after the Supreme Court's decision 
in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). Exchange Act 
Release No. 25,035, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) " 84,163 (Oct. 15, 
1987). 
69. Exchange Act Release No. 19,813, [1982-1983] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) " 83,356 
(May 26, 1983) (setting forth the SEC's history of support for arbitration as an economical 
alternative); Exchange Act Release No. 20,397, [1983-1984] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) " 
83,452 (Nov. 18, 1983). 
70. Exchange Act Release No. 20,397, supra note 68, " 83,452 at 86,357 & n.6. 
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principles.71 
Thus, in the years after Wilko, both the SEC and the courts 
seemed fairly confident of the view that claims asserted under the 
federal securities laws, primarily the Securities Act and the Ex­
change Act, were clear exceptions to the Arbitration Act; there­
fore, pre-dispute arbitration agreements between the broker and 
customer were not enforced with regard to these claims.72 
IV. JUDICIAL RECONSIDERATION 
The question of the arbitrability of Rule 10b-5 claims, while 
seemingly settled by the lower courts, had not been decided by 
the Supreme Court. In 1985, the question was opened for new 
consideration by the Supreme Court's decision in Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. u. Byrd.73 After the lower courts had come to con­
flicting decisions in reexamining this question, the Court ulti­
mately concluded in Shearson/American Express, Inc. u. McMa­
hon," that Rule lOb-5 claims are arbitrable. In order to 
understand the basis for the McMahon decision and to consider 
whether it provides a satisfactory resolution of the issue, it is nec­
essary to first consider Byrd, and the conflicts to which it led. 
A. The Byrd Decision 
In Byrd, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of arbi­
71. [d. at 86,356-58. In fact, the SEC's Division of Market Regulation subsequently indi­
cated it would not recommend that action be taken under Rule 15c2-2 for a clause drafted 
by the Securities Industry Association for inclusion in its member's customer agreements 
which provided in pertinent part: "It is understood that the following agreement to arbi­
trate does not constitute a waiver of the right to seek a judicial forum where such a waiver 
would be void under the federal securities laws." [July-Dec.] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 41, at 1860 (Oct. 18, 1985). 
72. The SEC showed this confidence that the law on this question was settled when it 
stated: 
In sum, the judicial decisions involving the applicability of Section 14 of the 
Act and Section 29 of the Exchange Act to customer arbitration agreements have 
delineated a set of investor-broker disputes for which arbitration may not be 
compelled pursuant to the arbitration clause of a customer agreement entered 
into at the time of opening an account or at any time prior to the dispute. 
Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, supra note 67, 11 82,122, at 81,977; Exchange Act Release 
No. 20,397, [1983-1984] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 83,452. The Supreme Court noted that this 
language only stated what the SEC thought courts of appeals were deciding in this area 
and did not show the "independent analysis" that would shed light on the issue. Shearson/ 
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2341 n.3 (1987). 
73. 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
74. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). 
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trability of a Rule 10b-5 claim, but rather the related problem of 
determining the treatment of state law claims that are filed with 
federal securities claims when there is a request for arbitration 
under a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Under the Arbitration 
Act, the state law claims would normally be sent to arbitration 
since there was no federal concern that would implicate Wilko.711 
Some federal courts, however, were concerned about the conse­
quences of such a procedure in the event the state law claim arose 
out of the same transaction as the federal claim. To send such 
state law claims to arbitration raised questions of economy, since 
many of the same issues would be addressed in both forums. In 
addition, there was concern that an arbitrator's resolution of is­
sues might estop the federal court from considering those issues, 
thus depriving the plaintiff of his or her right to a federal forum. 
As a result, a number of courts concluded that the claims were so 
"intertwined" that the state claims should also be retained in fed­
eral court and not submitted to arbitration.76 
In Byrd, a federal claim was asserted under Rule 10b-5, and the 
defendant asked the district court to submit the state law claims 
to arbitration. The defendant assumed that the arbitration clause 
could not be used to force the Rule 10b-5 claim into arbitration, 
and therefore did not request arbitration of the federal claim." 
As a result, the Supreme Court refused to consider whether a 
Rule lOb-5 claim would be subject to arbitration.78 The Court did 
hold, however, that if state and federal claims are brought in a 
single complaint when a pre-dispute arbitration agreement exists, 
the state law claims must be sent to arbitration even if it creates 
bifurcated proceedings.79 The closest the majority came to ad­
75. It is clear today that the Arbitration Act applies to state law ciaims if they involve 
transactions involving commerce or maritime matters. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 & 3 (1982); Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 400-01 (1967); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic 
Company of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 201-02 (1956). This is so, even if the claims are 
asserted in state court. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-17 (1984); Moses H. 
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983) (dicta). 
The Arbitration Act, however, apparently does not create federal question jurisdiction. 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 460 U.S. at 25 n.32 (dicta); Hirshman, supra note 22, 
at 1341. 
76. The Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits adopted this position while the Sixth, Sev­
enth and Eighth Circuits rejected the intertwining doctrine. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 270 & nn.3, 
4 (citing cases). 
77. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 215. 
78. [d. at 215-16 n.l. 
79. The Court concluded that the delay inherent in a bifurcated proceeding was not a 
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dressing the issue of the arbitrability of the Rule 10b-5 claims was 
a footnote which traced the history of the non-arbitrability prin­
ciple.8o In that discussion, the Court referred to its decision in 
Scherk v. Alberto Culver CO.81 which had questioned the applica­
bility of Wilko to Rule 10b-5 claims.82 
In a concurring opinion, Justice White pointed out that there 
was substantial doubt as to whether Wilko would apply to claims 
under the Exchange Act.83 In his view, the three interconnecting 
factors which led to the Wilko decision-the waiver language of 
section 14 of the Securities Act; the differences between the ele­
ments of a section 12(2) claim and a common law claim; and the 
expanded jurisdictional provisions of the Securities Act-were 
not present in a Rule lOb-5 claim. In support of this view, Justice 
White also cited Scherk.84 While agreeing that the question was 
not before the Court, Justice White asked lower courts to recon­
sider the question. 
The Byrd decision, especially Justice White's concurring opin­
ion, precipitated a reconsideration of the coverage of Wilko. 81i 
This reconsideration was also suggested by the Court's decision in 
Scherk and in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym­
strong enough federal interest, absent "a countervailing policy manifested in another fed­
eral statute," to overcome the strong congressional interest, evidenced in the Arbitration 
Act, to enforce private agreements to arbitrate. [d. at 221. This analysis by the Court is 
analogous to the approach that it has taken with respect to pendent and ancillary jurisdic­
tion, where the Court has refused to allow lower federal courts to assert jurisdiction over a 
"common nucleus of operative facts" for reasons of judicial economy where Congress has 
negated the assertion of jurisdiction. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 
365 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. I, 14-18 (1976). Similarly, the Arbitration Act 
effectively negates any attempt by the federal courts to assert control over the state law 
claims on grounds of economy. 
The Court in Byrd also rejected the argument that the state law claims should be re­
tained to avoid a situation in which the federal court might be collaterally estopped from 
reconsidering an issue previously decided in arbitration. The Court suggested, without de­
ciding, that preclusion might not be appropriate, and that the courts should fashion rules 
to protect federal interests. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221-23 (citing McDonald v. City of West 
Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 287-88 (1984)); see infra note 174. 
80. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 215-16 n.l. 
81. 417 U.S. 506 (1974); see infra note 87. 
82. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513-14. 
83. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 224-25 (White, J., concurring). A criticism of Justice White's rea­
soni.ng is set out in Comment, Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934, 1986 DUKE L.J. 548, 565-71. 
84. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 225. 
85. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2348-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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outh, Inc. 86 In both of these cases the Supreme Court sent claims 
asserted under federal law to arbitration pursuant to pre-dispute 
agreements. Each case involved an international transaction: the 
Scherk claim was asserted under Rule 10b-5, and the Mitsubishi 
Motors claim involved allegations of antitrust violations under 
the Sherman Act.87 In each case, the plaintiff argued that, under 
the reasoning of Wilko, the claim should not be consigned to the 
arbitration process. The Supreme Court held in both cases that 
the claims should be sent to arbitration because an international 
transaction was involved, and because principles of comity re­
quired enforcement of international arbitration provisions.88 The 
Court questioned, however, whether the claims asserted would 
have been non-arbitrable if they had been domestic claims. 
In Scherk, the Court first made its "colorable argument" that 
Wilko did not apply to Rule lOb-5 claims. The Court reasoned 
that because Congress did not provide an express private remedy 
86. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
87. In Scherk, the plaintiff, an American corporation, purchased certain foreign busi­
nesses from a German citizen. The contract contained a provision providing for the arbi­
tration of disputes. When the plaintiff discovered that the trademark rights purchased 
under the contract had encumbrances which affected their value, it brought suit to rescind 
the contract claiming fraudulent misrepresentations in violation of Rule 10b-5. The dis­
trict court rejected a motion for a stay pending arbitration and enjoined the defendant 
from proceeding with the arbitration. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit af­
firmed. Both lower courts relied on Wilko in deciding the case, Scherk v. Alberto Culver 
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 508-10 (1974). 
In Mitsubishi Motors, a Puerto Rico corporation entered into a distribution agreement 
to sell vehicles built by Mitsubishi, a Japanese manufacturer of automobiles. As part of 
this arrangement, the parties entered into a sales agreement which included an arbitration 
clause. When problems arose concerning the distribution of vehicles, Mitsubishi filed suit 
in the Federal District Court for the District of Puerto Rico seeking an order to compel 
arbitration pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). Jurisdiction in the case was based on 9 U.S.C. § 
201 (1982), which authorizes district courts to enforce arbitration agreements under "The 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards of June 
10, 1958." The defendant counterclaimetl based upon various grounds, including a Sher­
man Act claim. The district court refused to send several of the claims, including the 
antitrust claim, to arbitration. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and 
ordered the antitrust claim to arbitration on the grounds that it involved an international 
transaction. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 616-24. 
88. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-20; Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 629. In Mitsubishi Mo­
tors the Court stated: 
As in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., we conclude that concerns of international 
comity, respect for the capacity of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensi­
tivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in 
the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties' agreement, even 
assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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as it did under section 12(2) of the Securities Act, Rule 10b-5 
claims did not evince a congressional concern by the establish­
ment of a "special right" which required a judicial forum.89 More­
over, the Court noted that while there were anti-waiver provisions 
in both statutes, the Exchange Act lacked the type of provisions 
that the court in Wilko was concerned with.90 
In Mitsubishi Motors, the Court sought to clarify its position in 
response to the argument that, under the Arbitration Act, the 
Court should not construe arbitration agreements to cover any 
federal statutory claim unless the agreement specifically refers to 
that claim.91 The Court rejected this presumption against arbitra­
tion and indicated that each statute had to be examined to deter­
mine whether its text or legislative history evinced a congres­
sional intent to preclude waiver of a judicial remedy.92 
In balancing the various arguments in opposition to the arbitra­
89. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513-14; see supra text accompanying notes 60-66. 
90. 	 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514. Specifically, the Court stated: 

Furthermore, while both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 

Act of 1934 contain sections barring waiver of compliance with any "provision" 

of the respective Acts, certain of the "provisions" of the 1933 Act that the Court 

held could not be waived by Wilko's agreement to arbitrate find no counterpart 

in the 1934 Act. In particular, the Court in Wilko noted that the jurisdictional 

provision of the 1933 Act. . . allowed a plaintiff to bring suit "in any court of 

competent jurisdiction-federal or state-and removal from a state court is pro­

hibited." . . . The analogous provision of the 1934 Act, by contrast, provides for 

suit only in the federal district courts that have "exclusive jurisdiction," ... 

thus significantly restricting the plaintiffs choice of forum. 

Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). 
91. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 624-25. While the basis for this argument is not 
clear, it is arguable that the existence of a statutory claim showed Congress's intent to 
reserve the matter to the courts, and therefore only an express waiver should be enforced. 
Moreover, the dissent argued that "[n]othing in the text of the [Arbitration] Act, nor its 
legislative history, suggests that Congress intended to authorize the arbitration of any 
statutory claims." Id. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Justice Black's dissent in 
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 418 (1967) and Cohen & 
Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 281 (1926». 
92. Id. at 625-28. The Court concluded that, in light of the federal policy favoring arbi­
tration, issues concerning the scope of the agreement should be resolved in favor of arbi­
tration. Once it is decided that the agreement requires arbitration, it is appropriate to 
examine the statute which creates the claim to determine if Congress has taken a negative 
position toward arbitration of the claim. As the Court stated: 
Just as it is the congressional policy manifested in the Federal Arbitration Act 
that requires courts liberally to construe the scope of arbitration agreements 
covered by that Act, it is the congressional intention expressed in some other 
statute on which the courts must rely to identify any category of claims as to 
which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable. 
Id. at 627. 
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tion of antitrust cases93 against the "strong belief in the efficacy 
of arbitral procedures for the resolution of international commer­
cial disputes,"9' the Court in Mitsubishi Motors, reviewed the 
concerns which led the federal courts of appeals which had ad­
dressed the issue to unanimously reject arbitration in antitrust 
cases.9 /1 In the course of its decision, the Court showed strong sup­
port for the arbitration process. In addressing the argument that 
antitrust cases were too complex for the arbitral process, the 
Court pointed out that, with the proper selection of arbitrators 
based on the nature of the claim and the effective use of experts, 
arbitration is capable of effectively handling antitrust claims, 
while at the same time limiting the costs and time involved in the 
process.96 Moreover, the Court was unwilling to accept the pro­
position that arbitrators would be inherently hostile to business 
restraints since it assumed that the process of selection would 
protect against such a bias.97 Finally, the Court reasoned that the 
availability of court review of the arbitration decision at the time 
of enforcement would insure that the arbitration process fur­
thered the public interest in the enforcement of the antitrust 
laws.96 
93. 	The Court summarized the arguments against arbitration as follows: 

First, private parties playa pivotal role in aiding governmental enforcement of 

the antitrust laws by means of the private action for treble damages. Second, 

"the strong possibility that contracts which generate antitrust disputes may be 

contracts of adhesion militates against automatic forum determination by con­

tract." Third, antitrust issues, prone to complication, require sophisticated legal 

and economic analysis, and thus are "ill-adapted to strengths of the arbitral pro­

cess, i.e., expedition, minimal requirements of written rationale, simplicity, re­

sort to basic concepts of common sense and simple equity." Finally, just as "is­

sues of war and peace are too important to be vested in the generals, ... 

decisions as to antitrust regulation of business are too important to be lodged in 

arbitrators chosen from the business community-particularly those from a for­





[d. at 632 (quoting the opinion below, 723 F.2d 155, 162 (1st Cir. 1983) as having "dis­
tilled" the doctrines against arbitration of antitrust regulations from American Safety 
Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1968». 
94. Mitsubi.~hi Motors, 473 U.S. at 631. 
95. [d. at 628-40. The view that antitrust claims were non-arbitrable had been accepted 
by the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits. [d. at 655-57 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (citing cases). 
96. [d. at 633-34. 
97. [d. at 634. 
98. [d. at 636-38. While this conclusion was based on the enforcement provisions of 
"The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 
10, 1958," id. at 638 (citing art. V(2)(b), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520), the general tenor of the 
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The decision in Scherk, standing alone, did not have much im­
pact on the lower federal courts' denial of arbitration of federal 
statutory claims, particularly in the Rule lOb-5 area.99 The addi­
tion, however, of the decisions in Mitsubishi Motors and 
Byrd-especially Byrd, with its concurring opinion by Justice 
White-caused many lower federal courts to reevaluate earlier de­
cisions on this question. loo The lower courts split on the issue; 
some relied on Wilko to limit the use of arbitration, while others 
supported the use of the arbitration process as a means of dealing 
with these claims. In order to appreciate the differences between 
these two approaches, it is appropriate to examine some of the 
judicial responses to these Supreme Court decisions. 
B. Conflicting Circuit Views 
The courts of appeals that considered the question after Byrd 
divided on the question of the arbitrability of Rule 10b-5 claims. 
In some cases, the courts felt bound by earlier circuit decisionslol 
concluding that since the question had not been specifically ad­
dressed by the Supreme Court in the period since Wilko, they 
would not find that these claims were arbitrable. lo2 
Court's analysis suggested a greater willingness to inquire into an arbitration decision than 
shown in Wilko. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44; see infra note 194. 
99. For example, in Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 437-38 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 432 
U.S. 910 (1977), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that "significant 
policies reflected in the securities laws and the Bankruptcy Act" required that a motion to 
compel arbitration be denied, despite the fact that Scherk had been decided and that the 
defendants cited to it. [d. 
100. At the time that Shearson/American Express Inc. petitioned for certiorari, it stated 
that 118 cases on this point had been decided since Byrd, with 76 decisions to send claims 
to arbitration and 42 cases refusing to do so. Petition for Certiorari at n.1 and Appendix E, 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). 
101. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 797 F.2d 1197, 1201 
(3d Cir. 1986); King v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 796 F.2d 59, 60 (5th Cir. 1986). 
102. In Jacobson, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit pointed out that an earlier 
decision rejected Scherk as limiting Wilko, and concluded that the existence of similar 
anti-waiver provisions in the Securities Act and Exchange Act warranted treating them 
the same. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1201 (citing Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, 538 F.2d 532, 536-37 (3d Cir. 1976». The court stated that the majority in Byrd 
had expressly declined to consider the question of the applicability of Wilko in this area. 
[d. at 1201. Finally, the court concluded that the only concern in Mitsubishi Motors was 
the interpretation of an arbitration agreement, and therefore Mitsubishi Motors did not 
provide contrary precedent. [d. at 1201-02. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the 
court sent the RICO claims to arbitration since there is no anti-waiver provision in that 
statute, except in those cases where the predicate acts were violations of Rule lOb-5. [d. at 
1202-03. 
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While continuing to prohibit the arbitration of Rule 10b-5 
claims, some courts found it appropriate to consider the area 
more fully before making a determination. l03 In some cases, de­
spite the existence of circuit precedent in support of non-arbi­
trability,tM the courts chose to consider whether Scherk's "colora­
ble argument" and Justice White's concurring opinion in Byrd 
required a different result. 1011 These courts focused on the similar­
ity between the anti-waiver provisions of the two securities stat­
utes involved,108 and the fact that plaintiffs in each case were 
seeking special rights which required a judicial forum.l07 While it 
was argued that Mitsubishi Motors suggested that the develop­
ment of arbitration made the need for a judicial forum less im­
portant, the courts did not consider such a possibility as a suffi­
cient reason for treating Rule 10b-5 claims differently from 
section 12(2) claims.l08 In addition, the courts viewed the special 
jurisdictional provisions of the Exchange Act as evidence of a 
The King opinion was much briefer than Jacobson. It simply pointed out that since 
Byrd had not addressed the question, the court would follow its prior decisions. King, 796 
F.2d at 60. 
103. The opinion of the court of appeals in Sterne v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 808 
F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1987), is a hybrid that relied on circuit precedent for its decision, id. at 
482-83 (citing Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979)), but 
also analyzed Wilko. The court stated: 
Wilko weighed the policy favoring arbitration against the policy inherent in the 
anti-fraud protection of the securities laws involved, and felt that the latter poli­
cies were weightier and should prevail. Although there are differences between 
the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the rationale of Wilko persuades us that, despite his 
agreement to do so, Sterne should not be compelled to arbitrate. 
[d. at 483. 
104. See, e.g., Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d 1032, 1034 (11th Cir. 1986); McMa­
hon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 
2332 (1987). 
105. See, e.g., Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1035 (recognizing that Wilko is distinguishable, and so 
not controlling, but stating that the question is whether the similarities are such that the 
court should follow Wilko's reasoning); Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 
520, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that it would consider the matter "in light of the ques­
tions raised by Justice White") vacated, 107 S. Ct. 3202 (1987), rev'd per curium, 837 F.2d 
867 (9th Cir. 1988); McMahon, 788 F.2d at 97-98 (considering the Scherk and Byrd argu­
ments but stating that it would be "improvident" to disregard clear judicial precedent). 
106. See, e.g., Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1036; Conover, 794 F.2d at 523; McMahon, 788 F.2d at 
96-97. 
107. See, e.g., Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1035; Conover, 794 F.2d at 524; McMahon, 788 F.2d at 
98. 
108. See, e.g., Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1037 (suggesting that even if the need for a judicial 
forum was "less compelling" because of improvements in arbitration, it had not changed 
the result in section 12(2) cases and there was no legitimate basis for treating claims under 
Rule 10b-5 and section 12(2) differently for purposes of arbitration). 
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strong congressional concern with providing a judicial forum m 
the same manner as the Securities Act provisions.109 
Having considered these points, two of the courts looked to 
support their position against arbitration of Rule 10b-5 claims by 
considering Congress's 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act.l1O 
One provision of those amendments specifically authorized com­
pulsory arbitration of securities claims between securities profes­
sionals. lll In reference to this amendment, the Conference Report 
stated: 
The Senate bill amended section 28 of the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934 with respect to arbitration proceedings be­
tween self-regulatory organizations and their participants, mem­
bers, or persons dealing with members or participants. The 
House amendment contained no comparable provision. The 
House receded to the Senate. It was the clear understanding of 
the conferees that this amendment did not change existing law, 
as articulated in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), concerning 
the effect of arbitration proceeding provisions in agreements en­
tered into by persons dealing with members and participants of 
self-regulatory organizations. ll2 
An examination of this language shows its ambiguity, since it is 
unclear whether Congress was endorsing Wilko for section 12(2) 
cases, the extension of Wilko to Rule 10b-5 cases, or the use of 
Wilko limited by the "colorable argument" language of Scherk, 
which had been decided in 1974.113 The two courts of appeals 
109. See, e.g., Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1036; Conover, 794 F.2d at 523. 
110. Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1037-38; Conover, 794 F.2d at 524. 
111. Section 28(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was amended to read: 
(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to modify existing law with 
regard to the binding effect (1) on any member of or participant in any self­
regulatory organization of any action taken by the authorities of such organiza­
tion to settle disputes between its members or participants, (2) on any municipal 
securities dealer or municipal securities broker of any action taken pursuant to a 
procedure established by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board to settle 
disputes between municipal securities dealers and municipal securities brokers, 
or (3) of any action described in paragraph (1) or (2) on any person who has 
agreed to be bound thereby. 
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1982). 
112. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 179, 321, 342. 
113. To illustrate this point, the court in Wolfe noted that each side had cited this 
language as supporting its position. Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1037. The Supreme Court empha­
sized the ambiguity of this language in discounting its significance in deciding McMahon, 
107 S. Ct. at 2343. See infra note 155. 
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which ruled in favor of non-arbitrability, however, gave this lan­
guage some weight as supporting their position.lH 
The two courts of appeals which decided in favor of arbitration 
of Rule 10b-5 claims during this period considered the same argu­
ments but came to a different conclusion.lul These courts found 
persuasive the distinctions noted by the Supreme Court between 
claims arising under Rule 10b-5 and claims to which Wilko was 
applicable; reference was made to the narrower jurisdictional pro­
vision of the Exchange Act, and the difference between express 
and implied remedies. The decisions, however, lacked a clear 
analysis of why these distinctions should lead to different results, 
other than to state that the distinctions indicated that Congress 
did not intend to override the strong federal policy favoring en­
forcement of arbitration agreements embodied in the Arbitration 
Act.HS Both courts agreed that the rule permitting arbitration of 
114. Although the Eleventh Circuit in Wolfe recognized that the language of the Con­
ference Report could be taken as nothing more than an "endorsement of Wilko," the court 
viewed the failure of Congress to disavow the application of Wilko to Rule 10b-5 claims as 
supportive of its position. Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1037-38. 
The Ninth Circuit went further and found the legislative history "compelling" on the 
question of the application of Wilko to Rule 10b-5 claims. Conover, 794 F.2d at 524 (citing 
Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 538 F.2d 532, 537 (3d Cir. 1976). It found 
additional support in the fact that Congress had ratified the judicial remedy under Rule 
10b-5 by not acting to eliminate it. [d. at 524 (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 
459 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1983)). The Conover court also noted that the SEC asserted that 
brokers had to make customers aware of their rights to a judicial forum under the Securi­
ties Act and Exchange Act, notwithstanding any prior agreements to arbitrate. Id. at 524 
(citing Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, supra note 67); see supra text accompanying 
notes 67-72. But see Sterne v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 808 F.2d 480, 481 (6th Cir. 
1987) (The court indicated that the Securities Exchange Association, Inc. had filed an 
amicus curiae brief supporting the defendant's position that the Rule 10b-5 claim should 
be sent to arbitration pursuant to the pre-dispute agreement.). 
115. Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986); 
Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 1986). 
116. 	As the First Circuit stated: 

[Tlhe 1934 Act, unlike the 1933 Act, does not expressly provide individuals a 

right to·a judicial forum. Because of the absence of any express "provision" for a 

judicial forum under the 1934 Act, we conclude that the 1934 Act's anti-waiver 

clause, by itself, does not suffice to indicate a Congressional intent to preclude 

arbitration. 
Page, 806 F.2d at 296 (footnote omitted). 
The Eighth Circuit went somewhat further in Phillips and pointed out not only the 
express/implied distinction, but that the Securities Act provides a choice of forum, not 
exclusive jurisdiction as the Exchange Act does. The court also pointed out that the Secur­
ities Act, unlike the Exchange Act and common-law securities actions, does not require a 
plaintiff to prove scienter in order to recover, thus creating a special right. Phillips, 795 
F.2d at 1397-98. Interestingly, the First Circuit thought that the exclusive jurisdiction "ar­
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Rule 10b-5 claims was not changed by the 1975 amendments to 
the Exchange Act since it was not clear what Congress had meant 
by its statement concerning Wilko. ll7 The Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit explicitly relied on the Supreme Court's view in 
Mitsubishi Motors that the modern process of arbitration was ca­
pable of handling complex federal statutory rights.118 Therefore, 
the court concluded that it was inappropriate to consider "the al­
leged ineffectiveness of the arbitral forum in deciding the arbi­
trability of a federal statutory right."u9 
C. Analysis of Conflicting Views 
The conflict which arose among the courts of appeals in analyz­
ing the arbitrability of Rule 10b-5 claims in the period after Byrd 
was primarily centered around two main points. The first point 
arose out of the suggestion in Scherk that Rule 10b-5 claims were 
distinguishable from section 12(2) claims and therefore the Wilko 
analysis should not apply. Much of the discussion of questions 
such as the distinction between express and implied remedies, for 
example, centered on this aspect of the analysis. The second 
point of dispute was whether Rule 10b-5 claims standing alone 
warranted an exception to the Arbitration Act's principle of arbi­
trability. This analysis moved away from the "colorable argu­
ment" questions, and instead sought to examine Congress's inten­
tions in this area. Each of these points will be analyzed more fully 
in order to judge the merits of the positions taken. 
The arguments concerning the distinction between the Rule 
lOb-5 and section 12(2) claims centered around the three main 
elements which led to the Wilko decision:120 (1) the existence of 
the anti-waiver provision in section 14 of the Securities Act;121 (2) 
the special nature of the right under section 12(2) of the Securi­
guably" indicated the importance of a federal court forum. Page, 806 F.2d at 296. 
117. Page, 806 F.2d at 296-97 n.10; Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1398 n.17. The Eighth Circuit 
in Phillips also disposed of the plaintiffs' argument that Rule 15c2-2 supported their posi­
tion by pointing out that the rule was promulgated after the contracts involved in the case 
had been executed, and also that it did nothing more than state the SEC's interpretation 
of the present law. The court stated that it disagreed with the SEC analysis. [d.; see supra 
note 72. 
118. Page, 806 F.2d at 297 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
473 U.S. 614 (1985)); see supra text accompanying notes 93-98. 
119. Page, 806 F.2d at 297. 
120. See supra text accompanying notes 30-44. 
121. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35. 
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ties Act which was substantively complex and therefore not to be 
entrusted to other than a judicial forum;122 and (3) the special 
jurisdictional provisions which allowed plaintiffs to choose a state 
or federal forum, and to refuse removal if a state forum was cho­
sen-thus showing a clear preference for a judicial determination 
of the issues raised.123 By critically reviewing these factors in light 
of the cases already considered, it is possible to evaluate their ap­
propriateness as a basis for decision. 
1. Statutory Anti-Waiver Provision 
This first element requires the court to consider the applicable 
statutory claim to determine whether Congress intended to over­
ride the basic federal policy set forth in the Arbitration Act.124 
The policy of the Arbitration Act is to encourage arbitration by 
directing courts to enforce arbitration contracts in the same man­
ner as they would any other contract.126 In considering the section 
12(2) claim under the Securities Act, the Wilko Court found the 
congressional intent to override that policy in the language of sec­
tion 14 of the Securities Act. Section 14 prohibits the enforce­
ment of any pre-dispute provision which purports to "waive com­
pliance with any provision of this title or of the rules and 
regulations of the Commission. 1I126 While the language of section 
29 of the Exchange Act is essentially the same, a different result 
may be warranted. 127 As stated in Scherk l28 and by Justice White 
in Byrd,129 the investor is not "waiving compliance with any pro­
vision of this title" with respect to the Exchange Act, because no 
122. [d. at 436-38. 
123. [d. at 435. 
124. [d. The decisions examined focus on this concern with regard to congressional in­
tent. As the Supreme Court stated in Mitsubishi Motors: 
Just as it is the congressional policy manifested in the Federal Arbitration Act 
that requires courts liberally to construe the scope of arbitration agreements 
covered by that Act, it is the congressional intention expressed in some other 
statute on which the courts must rely to identify any category of claims as to 
which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable. 
Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 627. 
125. See supra notes 23-24 arid accompanying text. 
126. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (see supra text accompanying note 35 for the text of section 14); 
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35 ("This arrangement to arbitrate is a 'stipulation,' and we think 
the right to select the judicial forum is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived under 
§ 14 of the Securities Act."). 
127. See supra note 65. 
128. 417 U.S. at 513-14. 
129. 470 U.S. at 224-25 (White, J., concurring). 
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provision of the statute authorizes a private right of action under 
Rule 10b-5; therefore, the non-waiver provision is arguably inap­
plicable. If this position is accepted, there is no evidence of a con­
gressional intent to override the general federal policy in favor of 
arbitration. 
Taken at face value, it is clear that there is a distinction be­
tween section 12(2) actions under the Securities Act, and implied 
actions under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. It is not clear, 
however, whether that distinction should make a difference in the 
treatment of the waiver provision in the two cases. In recent 
years, the Supreme Court has made it clear that it will not imply 
a private right of action under a federal statute unless it finds 
evidence of congressional intent in the statutory language or legis­
lative history to authorize such action. 130 Once that intent is es­
tablished and the court implies the private right of action, the 
right of action is subject to the express jurisdictional provision of 
the statute, which requires the federal court to hear the case.131 
Applying this reasoning to the Wilko analysis, once an implied 
claim is established it is required to be heard in federal court; 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement would therefore permit 
a waiver of the jurisdictional provision of the statute. If the Wilko 
Court was concerned about protecting the plaintiffs choice of fo­
rum, which Congress had granted through the jurisdictional pro­
visions of the Securities Act, it is arguable· that a court should 
also be careful to preserve the Exchange Act jurisdictional provi­
sion, which indicates that Congress wanted these claims heard ex­
clusively in federal court. Thus, this element of the Wilko analy­
sis does not present a compelling reason for a different treatment 
of these two types of claims on the issue of arbitrability. 
2. Sp~cial Nature of the Right 
Even if the anti-waiver provision, standing alone, does not pre­
sent a compelling reason for treating these claims differently, it 
130. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979) ("[W)hat 
must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy 
asserted ...."); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). The Court stated 
that "our task is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the 
private right of action," id. at 568, and further stated that "[t)he central inquiry remains 
whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of 
action," id. at 575. 
131. R JENNINGS & J. MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 811 (5th ed. 1982). 
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can be argued that it does so when reviewed in light of the special 
nature of the section 12(2) claim. In Wilko, the Court pointed out 
that since section 12(2) claims create special rights intended to 
protect investors, whom Congress viewed as operating at a disad­
vantage in dealing with issuers and dealers, it was important to 
determine if that protection would be lessened by allowing arbi­
tration. ls2 The Court was concerned that the arbitration process 
was not equipped to decide the numerous complex legal questions 
of vital federal concern which section 12(2) raises.133 In its view, 
arbitration was best suited for the resolution of simple questions, 
and nothing more. IS' This was particularly troubling for the Court 
because the arbitrators' decision would only be subject to limited 
review.l3Ii To the extent that this presents a strong reason for de­
nying arbitration, it equally applies to Rule lOb-5 cases. While 
the issues raised are different from those under section 12(2), 
there is an ever increasing number of complex legal issues which 
must be resolved in many Rule 10b-5 cases. IS6 If, as the Court 
suggested, arbitrators are ill-prepared to deal with legal questions 
under section 12(2), it would seem that the same concerns would 
be present under Rule lOb-5, which has been used extensively for 
the protection of investors over the past thirty years. IS7 
132. Wilko, 346 u.s. at 435-37; Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, 806 
F.2d 291, 296 (1st Cir. 1986). 
133. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436; Page, 806 F.2d at 296. The Wilko Court focused on issues 
of "burden of proof," "reasonable care," and "material fact." A full discussion of the ele­
ments of section 12(2) is set out in L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1021-29. 
134. 	 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-36 (footnotes omitted), where the Court stated: 

Even though the provisions of the Securities Act, advantageous to the buyer, 

apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened in arbitration as compared to 

judicial proceedings. Determination of the quality of a commodity or the amount 

of money due under a contract is not the type of issue here involved. This case 

requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged violator 
of the Act. 
135. [d. 
136. E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) ("scienter" requirement); 
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), reh'g denied, 407 
U.S. 916 (reliance and causation); TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 
(1976) (materiality raised in the context of a proxy context, but relevant to Rule 10b-5 
claims); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983) (standing to bring a private 
action under Rule lOb-5). 
137. A detailed analysis of the development of Rule 10b-5 is set out in L. Loss, supra 
note 2, at 820-944. 
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3. Special Jurisdictional Provisions 
The concern with respect to the special jurisdictional provisions 
relates to the previously discussed waiver issue. Under the Securi­
ties Act, Congress provided investors with an advantage in that 
they have the power to choose a federal or a non-removable state 
forum. The Court in Wilko was reluctant to take away this ad­
vantage by enforcing an arbitration provision.lsB The Exchange 
Act does not provide the same advantage since it does not give 
the investor plaintiff a jurisdictional choice, but it does give the 
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over Exchange Act claims.ls9 
If the Court is reluctant to enforce a waiver of an expansive juris­
dictional right given to investors by Congress, the Court should 
also be reluctant to do so in a statutory setting in which Congress 
felt so strongly about the claims that it provided exclusive juris­
diction to the federal courts.140 The arbitration provision would 
138. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435. The jurisdictional provision of the Securities Act of 1933 
states: 
Sec. 22. (a) The district courts of the United States, and United States courts 
of any Territory, shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under this 
subchapter and under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission 
in respect thereto, and, concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of all suits 
in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by 
this subchapter .... No case arising under this subchapter and brought in any 
State court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the 
United States. 
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982). 
139. Section 27 of the Securities Act of 1934 provides: 
The district courts of the United States, and the United States courts of any 
Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regula­
tions thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce 
any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations there­
under .... 
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982). 
140. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 654-57 
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 
806 F.2d 291, 296 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that the existence of exclusive federal jurisdiction 
arguably allows "for the inference that Congress regarded the federal court forum to be an 
important one"); Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(comparing the jurisdictional provisions under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act 
and stating that the exclusive jurisdiction provision is "an even more forceful indication of 
Congress' intent that the federal courts oversee the interpretation and application of the 
1934 Act"), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 3203 (1987), rev'd per curiam, 837 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1988). 
An expansive discussion of exclusive jurisdiction under the securities laws, and possible 
limits thereon, is set out in Dickinson, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Role of 
States in Securities Regulation, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1201 (1980). 
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allow an arbitrator to decide a case which Congress has prohib­
ited a state court from deciding. It would be incongruous to dis­
tinguish the treatment of section 12(2) claims and Rule 10b-5 
claims based on the difference in these jurisdictional provisions. 
After examining the factors considered by the Court in Wilko, 
the only distinction between the two claims which has any merit 
is that implied rights of actions are different from specifically 
granted statutory causes of action. Arguably the specifically 
granted statutory right evidences a clear Congressional intent to 
override the Arbitration Act's policy in favor of arbitration, and, 
in a technical sense, the implied right of action does not fit within 
the statutory waiver language of the statutes. HI In a real sense, 
however, this seems to be an argument in favor of formalism as 
the basis for decision-making. As such, there appears to be no 
principled reason for distinguishing cases under Rule lOb-5 and 
section 12(2) on the issue of arbitrability. 
Perhaps because of the lack of a basis for distinguishing the 
claims, the Supreme Court, in considering the question of the 
arbitrability of Rule 10b-5 claims in Shearson/American Express, 
Inc. v. McMahon,142 chose to focus on the second point of dis­
pute: whether Congress had intended to exempt Rule 10b-5 
claims from the Arbitration Act. While the Court considered 
Wilko relevant in analyzing this question, the Court declined to 
distinguish the results in the two situations.H3 Thus, in consider­
ing the second point of dispute, it is appropriate to examine 
McMahon. 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 124-31. 
142. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). 
143. Justice O'Connor made this clear when she stated: "While stare decisis concerns 
may counsel against upsetting Wilko's contrary conclusion under the Securities Act, we 
refuse to extend Wilko's reasoning to the Exchange Act in light of the intervening regula­
tory developments." ld. at 2341. Justice Blackmun emphasized the majority's failure to 
address this distinction when he stated: 
There is no need to discuss in any detail that "colorable argument" which rests 
on alleged distinctions between pertinent provisions of the. Securities Act and 
those of the Exchange Act, because the court does not rely upon it today. In 
fact, the "argument" is important not so much for its substance as it is for its 
litigation role. It simply constituted a way of keeping the issue of arbitrability of 
§ 10(b) claims alive for those opposed to the result in Wilko. 
ld. at 2346-47 (footnotes omitted) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). The refusal to attempt to distinguish the two Acts was supported by the SEC in its 
amicus curiae brief, Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 18-26, which was also cited by 
Justice Blackmun in McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2347 n.2. 
, 
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D. The McMahon Decision 
In McMahon, the Supreme Court reviewed the decision by the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which refused to allow 
arbitration of both a Rule 10b-5 claim and a RICO claim under a 
pre-dispute arbitration agreement.H4 The court of appeals de­
clined to follow the defendants' suggestion that the court should 
revise its view that Rule 10b-5 claims are not arbitrable on the 
basis of the Scherk opinion and Justice White's concurrence in 
Byrd. The court concluded that the public interest in deterrence 
of misconduct in the securities industry necessitated judicial con­
trol. 14CI The court stated: 
[T]he similarity of the non-waiver provisions, § 14 of the 1933 
Act and § 29(a) of the 1934 Act, as well as the strong public 
policy concerns inherent in the securities laws and the legislative 
history that preceded their enactment, support the compelling 
. need for a judicial forum in the resolution of securities law dis­
putes. Although Scherk and Byrd may cast some doubt on 
whether the Supreme Court, if presented with the issue, would 
hold claims under § lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 to be non-arbitrable, 
it would be improvident for us to disregard clear judicial prece­
dent in this Circuit based on mere speculation. We think that 
the orderly administration of justice will be best served if we as 
one of the inferior courts follow Supreme Court precedent and 
adhere to the settled law of this Circuit, and a fortiori the dis­
trict courts should do likewise. 146 
144. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986). The 
Second Circuit reversed a district court decision to send the Rule 10b-5 claim to arbitra­
tion, but upheld the decision not to send the RICO claim to arbitration. [d. The district 
court relied on Scherk and Justice White's concurring opinion in Byrd in allowing arbitra­
tion of the Rule 10b-5 claim. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 
384, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
The district court's decision not to send the RICO claim to arbitration was based on 
what it viewed as "important federal policies inherent in the enforcement of RICO by the 
federal courts." [d. at 387. In affirming this decision, the court of appeals stated that 
RICO claims, like antitrust claims, fall into a special category of strong public interest 
which requires a judicial determination to develop a record and to insure "judicial clarifi­
cation and resulting consistency in resolving disputes under this relatively new statute." 
McMahon, 788 F.2d at 98-99. 
The Supreme Court unanimously decided that RICO claims were arbitrable under a 
pre-dispute agreement because there was no basis for concluding that Congress intended 
to exempt these claims from the Arbitration Act, nor that arbitration could not effectively 
handle these claims. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2343­
46 (1987). 
145. McMahon, 788 F.2d at 98. 
146. [d. 
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The Supreme Court began by pointing out that it was the 
plaintiff's burden to establish, through "the text, history, or pur­
poses of the statute"I47 which was the basis of the suit, that Con­
gress had intended to mandate an exception to the Arbitration 
Act's general policy of enforcing arbitration agreements.14S To 
meet this burden the plaintiff made three arguments, all of which 
were rejected by the Court. 
The plaintiff argued that the anti-waiver provision of section 29 
of the Exchange Act evidenced a congressional intent to override 
the mandate of the Arbitration Act.u9 This intent was clear be­
cause section 29 prohibits a waiver of the exclusive jurisdiction 
provision of the Exchange Act. This argument presented an op­
portunity for the Court to establish a position consistent with the 
earlier statements of Justice White by pointing out the distinc­
tion between express and implied rights of action, as well as other 
distinctions between the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. In­
stead, the Court addressed what it deemed to be the meaning of 
section 29 in light of its reading of Wilko.lIIO It rejected the view 
that section 29 prohibits the waiver of a judicial forum per se, 
and instead read Wilko "as barring waiver of a judicial forum 
only where arbitration is inadequate to protect the substantive 
rights at issue."Ul Having focused on section 29 as the primary 
source of congressional intent to negate the policies of the Arbi­
tration Act, and having limited that section's significance to the 
question of the adequacy of arbitration, the Court addressed the 
issue of whether arbitration was adequate for Rule 10b-5 
claims. 1 112 
147. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338. 
148. [d. at 2337-38. 
149. [d. at 2338-39. See supra note 56 for the text of section 29. 
150. The Court may have been influenced by the SEC's amicus curiae brief which sup­
ported arbitration of the Rule 1Ob-5 claim. In its brief, the SEC urged the Court not to 
distinguish between Securities Act and Exchange Act claims in deciding to arbitrate Rule 
10b-5 claims. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 21-26. 
151. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338-39 (citing Scherk and concluding that its decision in 
that case had turned on its determination that arbitration was adequate to protect the 
parties' statutory rights). 
152. The plaintiffs second argument was that section 29 prohibits pre-dispute arbitra­
tion agreements because of the unequal bargaining positions of the parties. The Court 
rejected this argument, stating that the only issue was whether the agreement would waive 
a statutory duty by limiting the plaintiffs ability to recover under the Act. If the answer 
to this was in the affirmative, then it would be irrelevant whether the agreement was 
voluntary or involuntary. [d. at 2339. 
1989] ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION 573 

In order to explore this issue, the Court had to address the un­
derlying rationale of Wilko: the concern that the arbitration pro­
cess was not capable of dealing with these issues.m Recognizing 
that the Wilko decision reflected judicial mistrust of arbitration, 
the Court stated that such mistrust was inconsistent with its sub­
sequent decisions, which had concluded that arbitration was ca­
pable of handling complex matters. 1M 
The Court found additional support for its view that there was 
no longer any basis for mistrusting arbitration in the 1975 amend­
ments to the Exchange Act. While the Court found the reference 
to Wilko in the legislative history of the amendments unhelpful, 
the Court gave great weight to the amendment to section 19, 
which provided the SEC with extensive power to regulate the ar­
bitration procedures approved by the various stock exchanges and 
registered securities associations. ll111 The grant of broad regulatory 
power satisfied the Court that, at least where arbitration proce­
dures were "subject to the Commission's section 19 authority, an 
arbitration agreement does not effect a waiver of the protections 
153. Id. at 2339-41. The Court noted three concerns of Wilko: (1) that arbitration was 
not suited for cases which required subjective findings; (2) that arbitrators were making 
legal determinations without judicial instructions, without stating the reasons for their 
decisions, and without having to establish a record; and (3) that courts had limited power 
to review an arbitrator's interpretation of law or to vacate an award. Id. at 2340. 
154. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2340 (citing Mitsubishi Motors, Byrd, Scherk, Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury 
Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983». The Court placed particular emphasis on Mitsub­
ishi Motors' endorsement of the arbitration process as a streamlined method for satisfac­
torily resolving claims with only limited supervision by the courts. Id. 
The Court also pointed out that Wilko had not been extended to securities disputes 
between member firms, nor to post-dispute arbitration agreements. The Court stated that 
this was further support for its decision to allow arbitration based on pre-dispute agree­
ments, since the underlying assumption must be that arbitration can effectively handle 
such matters. Id. at 2340-41. 
155. In considering the additional power given to the SEC, the Court pointed specifi­
cally to section 19(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2) (1982), which prohibits rule changes unless 
the SEC finds that they are consistent with the requirements of the Act, and to section 
19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1982), which gives the SEC broad powers to "abrogate, add to, 
and delete from" any such rule if it would further the objectives of the Act. McMahon, 
107 S. Ct. at 2341. 
The Court rejected the language of the Conference Report as support for the application 
of Wilko to the Exchange Act, because the legislative history relating to the amendments 
did not address this subject. The Court also stated that it was unclear from the language 
of the Conference Report whether the reference was only to Wilko or its application to the 
Exchange Act, and exactly what the committee members thought "existing law" provided. 
McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2343. See supra text accompanying notes 110-14 for the reference 
to Wilko in the legislative history of the amendments. 
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of the Act."UG Thus, the Court concluded that SEC supervision of 
arbitration procedures ensured an acceptable forum for the reso­
lution of claims under the Exchange Act. 1117 
The difficulty with the Court's opinion in McMahon is that 
having decided that the key question was the adequacy of arbitra­
tion procedures, it then assumed that they were adequate, or at 
least that SEC regulation would insure their adequacy. In many 
ways this is the same approach that led the Court to the opposite 
conclusion in Wilko.u8 Indeed, in McMahon, Justice Blackmun 
criticized the majority for accepting the adequacy of arbitration 
for securities disputes without a careful analysis to determine the 
accuracy of that assumption.1119 
In light of the McMahon decision, the arbitration process 
should be examined to determine whether it is adequate to deal 
with Rule 10b-5 claims. To the extent that problems are found, it 
is necessary to determine whether they can be solved by revisions 
of the procedures for arbitration under the supervision of the 
SEC and the various self-regulatory organizations ("SRO's"). Fi­
nally, if it is found that arbitration is adequate, it will be neces­
sary to consider whether the Court should reexamine Wilko and 
apply a single standard to the question of arbitrability of section 
12(2) and Rule 10b-5 claims. 
156. McMahon, 107 s. Ct. at 2341. 
157. The Court's language suggests that it might not validate an arbitration agreement 
which purports to set up the arbitration under the procedures of an organization not sub­
ject to SEC regulation, such as the American Arbitration Association. See Brief for SEC as 
Amicus Curiae at 20. But see infra note 211, which refers to an SEC staff letter suggesting 
that groups such as the American Arbitration Association might be used for securities 
arbitrations. 
158. In Wilko, Justice Frankfurter criticized the majority for its failure to consider the 
adequacy of the arbitration procedures. He stated: 
There is nothing in the record before us, nor in the facts of which we can take 
judicial notice, to indicate that the arbitral system as practiced in the City of 
New York, and as enforceable under the supervisory authority of the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, would not afford the plaintiff the 
rights to which he is entitled. 
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 439 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See supra note 51. 
159. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2349-50 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). Justice Blackmun dissented from the majority's view that Rule 1Ob-5 claims are 
arbitrable, but agreed that the RICO claim should be sent to arbitration. Justices Brennan 
and Marshall joined this opinion. Justice Stevens wrote separately, dissenting from the 
portion of the majority's opinion that held Wilko inapplicable to the Exchange Act. [d. at 
2359-60 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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V. THE ARBITRATION PROCESS 
A. Adequacy of Arbitration 
The Supreme Court, having defined the issue of the arbi­
trability of Rule 10b-5 claims as primarily a question of whether 
arbitration can effectively deal with these claims, has left several 
issues unresolved. What the Court has done is to place the pri­
mary responsibility on the SEC and the sponsoring SRO's to take 
action that will encourage public investor support while retaining 
the benefits of arbitration. In order to meet this responsibility 
and to evaluate the adequacy of the arbitration system for han­
dling Rule lOb-5 claims, it is necessary to consider the reasons for 
opposition.160 The primary arguments against arbitration of these 
types of claims are: (1) arbitrators are not well suited to deciding 
complex legal questions;161 (2) the absence of discovery places in­
vestors at a significant disadvantage in trying to establish a 
claim;162 (3) the informality of the arbitration process makes it 
difficult for courts to control the decision-making process;163 and 
(4) arbitration involves industry people deciding cases in place of 
the courts, which have been charged with the duty of enforcing 
the statutes regulating the securities industry in order to protect 
investors.164 
The belief that arbitration is incapable of handling complex le­
gal issues is grounded in the very nature of the system: in arbitra­
tion, the parties agree to give up the security that a court judg­
ment is more likely to be "correct," in return for the savings in 
time and money that the arbitration process provides.161i If the 
issue to be decided is whether a shipment of goods was defective, 
the parties may feel that an arbitrator is fully capable of resolving 
that question, and that even if it is decided incorrectly, both par­
ties have been better served by a speedy and,low cost determina­
tion. It is argued that the risk of a potentially incorrect decision 
made by an arbitrator in a securities fraud case is simply too 
great to be justified by the reduction in costs. That risk is consid­
160. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22. 
161. See supra note 18. 
162. See supra note 19. 
163. See supra note 20. 
164. See supra note 21. 
165. Mitsubishi Motors Inc. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 657 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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ered especially great in securities fraud cases for two reasons. 
First, there is a national interest in enforcement of the securities 
laws which must be carefully guarded by having courts decide 
this type of case. ISS Second, the issues are too important to the 
individual investor, who may have lost his or her life savings in 
the transaction, and will now have to rely on the industry, rather 
than a judge, to protect those interests. ls7 
This argument, that the risk in securities law cases is too great, 
assumes that arbitration forces us to pay a heavy price in return 
for cost and time savings-to wit, inferior decision-making. It has 
become increasingly evident, however, that the arbitration system 
which has developed in the securities industry provides a forum 
for arbitrators to carefully analyze and decide complex cases. In 
McMahon, the Supreme Court rejected the view that complexity 
of the issues was a deterrent to arbitration and found support for 
this in Mitsubishi Motors. ls8 In Mitsubishi Motors, the Court 
characterized the nature of arbitration by stating that "adaptabil­
ity and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration. The an­
ticipated subject matter of the dispute may be taken into account 
when the arbitrators are appointed, and arbitral rules typically 
provide for the participation of experts either employed by the 
parties or appointed by the tribunal."ls9 Moreover, it would be 
incongruous for the Court to conclude that an arbitration based 
on a pre-dispute agreement was incapable of dealing with the is­
sues involved in a securities fraud case, in light of the fact that 
courts have routinely permitted arbitration based on post-dispute 
agreements, or when the parties to the agreement are members of 
securities self-regulatory organizations.17o Courts have increas­
ingly accepted the proposition that the arbitral decision-making 
process is reasoned and expert. l7l While there may be problems 
166. See AJlegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 437-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 
(1977). 
167. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2355 (1987) (Black­
mun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
168. [d. at 2340 (citing Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 633-34). 
169. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 633 (footnote omitted). 
170. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2340-41; Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 633 (the Court's 
comment was limited to post-dispute agreements to arbitrate antitrust claims); Fletcher, 
Prillatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 71 
MINN: L. REV. 393, 421-27 (1987). 
171. Brener v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). After pointing 
out the Wilko concern that arbitration could not effectively resolve these claims, the 
Brener court went on to say: 
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with the system, the lack of reasoned and expert decision-making 
is not one of them. This argument, therefore, should not prevent 
us from taking advantage of the speed and economy provided by 
arbitration. 
The concern about tlme and cost has become even more fo­
cused since the decision in Byrd, in which the Court rejected the 
so-called "intertwining doctrine" by which lower federal courts 
resolved state law claims along with the non-arbitrable federal 
claims for reasons of economy.172 In so ruling, the Court opted for 
enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate state claims, even 
when to do so creates piecemeal litigation.173 Thus, if state law 
claims are involved (as they usually are), plaintiffs are placed in 
the unenviable position of having to litigate their claims in two 
separate forums, either simultaneously or seriatim. 174 Neither op-
Arbitration procedures, however, have become increasingly sophisticated since 
Wilko was decided, and the number of securities disputes being channeled into 
arbitration has risen significantly. 
A carefully developed structure has been established by the securities industry 
for arbitrating disputes, and the arbitrators available to consider disputes are 
generally knowledgeable individuals who have had experience working with the 
federal securities laws. 
Id. at 448 (footnote omitted) (citing Katsoris, supra note 18, at 283-87). 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79. 
173. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985). 
174. The majority in Byrd did not address the question of whether, in sending the state 
law claims to arbitration, a court should stay either proceeding or allow each to proceed at 
its own pace. In rejecting the argument that claims should not be sent to arbitration be­
cause they will be decided more quickly and thus have preclusive effect in the federal 
proceeding, the Court did state: 
Suffice it to say that in framing preclusion rules in this context, courts shall take 
into account the federal interests warranting protection. As a result, there is no 
reason to require that district courts decline to compel arbitration, or manipu­
late the ordering of the resulting bifurcated proceedings, simply to avoid an in­
fringement of federal interests. 
Id. at 223. A full discussion of the preclusive effect of arbitration decisions is set out in 
Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA 
L. REV. 623 (1988), in which the author states that lower courts have not followed Byrd's 
view on preclusion, and arguing for the use of preclusion in appropriate circumstances. Id. 
at 655, 669-73. 
In his concurring opinion in Byrd, Justice White took the position that the two proceed­
ings should go forward without reference to each other. He stated: 
The Court's opinion makes clear that a district court should not stay arbitra­
tion, or refuse to compel it at all, for fear of its preclusive effect. And I can 
perceive few, if any, other possible reasons for staying the arbitration pending 
the outcome of the lawsuit. Belated enforcement of the arbitration clause, 
though a less substantial interference than a refusal to enforce it at all, nonethe­
less significantly disappoints the expectations of the parties and frustrates the 
clear purpose of their agreement. In addition, once it is decided that the two 
578 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:541 
tion is beneficial to the plaintiff, usually an individual, who must 
decide how to allocate resources in that situation. The plaintiff 
will have to decide whether to accept the piecemeal litigation, or 
whether to take other action to avoid it, such as agreeing to arbi­
trate all of the claims, or voluntarily dismissing the state law 
claims.l7II It is also an inefficient option for the federal courts 
which must continue to hold or consider the federal claims while 
another tribunal, the arbitrator, is considering the same transac­
tion in another context.176 
The second argument against arbitration-lack of discovery 
procedures-may present a more serious problem.177 In order for 
proceedings are to go forward independently, the concern for speedy resolution 
suggests that neither should be delayed. While the impossibility of the lawyers 
being in two places at once may require some accommodation in scheduling, it 
seems to me that the heavy presumption should be that the arbitration and the 
lawsuit will each proceed in its normal course. And while the matter remains to 
be determined by the District Court, I see nothing in the record before us to 
indicate that arbitration in the present case should be stayed. 
Byrd, 470 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring). Notwithstanding this statement, some courts 
have stayed federal proceeding pending resolution of the arbitration. See, e.g., NPS Com­
munications, Inc. v. Continental Group, Inc., 760 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1985) (in an antitrust 
suit, the district court did not abuse its discretion in staying the federal claims pending 
the arbitration of contract claims); Brener v. Becker Pari bas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 453 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (staying the federal proceeding on the grounds that the arbitration "may 
well clarify and perhaps even simplify the issues that must be litigated"); Webb v. R. 
Rowland & Co., 613 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (in a securities law case, the court 
stayed the federal proceeding pending resolution of the securities arbitration since Byrd 
only stated that a stay of arbitration proceedings is not necessary). Other courts have 
questioned or rejected any stay of these proceedings. See, e.g., Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219, 
222-23 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that at least where Securities Act claims are before the 
court, the cases should proceed simultaneously unless there are "compelling reasons" to 
stay the proceedings); Shihadeh v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 461 (11th Cir. 
1985) (remanding the case to the district court to decide if it was correct in staying the 
federal proceedings in light of Justice White's opinion); Dimenstien v. Whiteman, 759 F.2d 
1514, 1517 (11th Cir. 1985) (emphasizing that since there is no preclusive effect, there is 
no point in ordering the time of the cases). Presumably, a district court which stays the 
proceedings is hoping that the matter will be resolved in whole or in part in arbitration, 
and that the federal proceedings will therefore benefit from the delay, while those oppos­
ing a stay feel a plaintiff is entitled to resolution of federal rights without delay. 
175. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 99 n.7 (2d Cir. 1986), 
rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987) (suggesting that if plaintiffs withdrew their 
pendent state law claims there would be no claims available for arbitration and bifurcated 
proceedings would be unnecessary). 
176. The Court in Byrd made no attempt to defend the efficiency of the bifurcated 
process which it set up, but simply stated that it was obliged to do so in light of the 
congressional policies evidenced in the Arbitration Act. 470 U;S. at 220-21. 
177. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2355 n.18 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (citing Katsoris, supra note 19, at 287 n.52). Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alter­
native, supra note 16, at 80; SOMMER, supra note 9, § 118.01[1]. 
; 
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a plaintiff-investor to recover under a Rule 10b-5 claim, it may be 
necessary to have access to internal documents of the defendants, 
to have questions answered, or to depose witnesses prior to the 
time of the arbitration. Normally, this type of discovery is not 
permitted in the arbitration process because it would mire the 
case in complicated preliminary matters that would effectively 
dissipate the speed and economy which are the hallmarks of arbi­
tration decision-making.178 Moreover, the presence of a formal 
discovery system may have a coercive effect on the attorneys in­
volved and cause them to use the system to its full extent, 
whether or not it is necessary. To avoid this, and the expense and 
delay that would inevitably result, it would be better to use tech­
niques currently available to insure informational equality with­
out an elaborate discovery system. For example, under the Uni-" 
form Code of Arbitration,179 the parties are directed to "cooperate 
in the voluntary exchange of such documents and information as 
will serve to expedite the arbitration."18o Moreover, the arbitrator 
178. Katsoris, supra note 19, at 287 n.52; cf. SOMMER, supra note 9, § 118.05[9]. While 
courts normally deny requests for discovery concerning a matter to be arbitrated, they will 
allow it in exceptional circumstances where it will aid the arbitration. Koch Fuel Intern., 
Inc. v. M/V South Star, 118 F.R.D. 318, 320-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (allowing"deposition of 
only witnesses with first-hand knowledge of the events who were about to leave the coun­
try and would be unavailable for arbitration); Willen ken, The Often Overlooked Use of 
Discovery in Aid of Arbitration and the Spread of the New York Rule to Federal Com­
mon Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 173, 181-82 (1979) (setting out the facts that have been cited by 
courts as a basis for allowing discovery). 
179. Uniform Code of Arbitration (as"amended), reprinted in Fifth Report of the Secur­
ities Industry Conference on Arbitration (Apr. 1986) (Exhibit C) [hereinafter Uniform 
Code of Arbitration]. The Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration [SICA) developed 
a Uniform Code of Arbitration which was adopted by participating SRO's in 1979 and 
1980. As discussed earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 154-56, the Supreme Court 
in McMahon emphasized that the 1975 Amendments to section 19 of the Exchange Act 
gave the SEC power to regulate the arbitration procedures of SRO's, which it has exer­
cised by the approval of the Uniform Code of Arbitration. Participating SRO's include: 
American Stock Exchange, Inc.; Boston Stock Exchange, Inc.; Chicago Board of Options 
Exchange, Inc.; Cincinnati Stock Exchange, Inc.; Midwest Stock Exchange Inc.; Municipal 
Securities Rulemaking Board; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; New York 
Stock Exchange, Inc.; Pacific Stock Exchange, Inc.; and Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc. 
See Fifth Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (Apr. 1986) [herein­
after Fifth Report]. These SRO's utilize the Uniform Code of Arbitration which they have 
adopted. SOMMER, supra note 9, § 118.05[1]. 
180. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 179, § 20(b). The New York Stock Ex­
change has taken this one step further, and mandated that the documents intended to be 
used at a hearing must be exchanged at least ten days before the hearing. Arbitrators 
"may" exclude from the hearing documents not so presented. N.Y.S.E. Arbitration Rule 
638, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 11 2638 (1988). 
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has the power "to direct the appearance of any person employed 
or associated with any member ... and/or the production of any 
records in the possession or control of such persons, members or 
member organization."lsl In addition to these rules, arbitrators 
have the discretionary power to adjourn any hearing. ls2 This rule 
would permit an adjournment if one of the parties is placed at a 
significant informational disadvantage that might require further 
time for preparation.ls3 Properly used, these mechanisms can in­
sure a full opportunity for each side to present its position with­
out resort to the development of an elaborate discovery process 
which would provide more information, but which would also 
cause the increased costs and delay that arbitration was intended 
to avoid. I" Although it has been suggested that, in light of Mc­
Mahon, the SEC and the SRO's should revise arbitration proce­
dures to increase discovery/sli the more appropriate response is to 
take no action until it can be determined whether the current 
procedures may be used effectively to meet the concerns of plain­
tiff-investors while maintaining the cost efficiency of arbitration. 
If arbitrators, the SRO's, and the SEC are sensitive to the 
problems which may arise in this area, an appropriate balance 
may be struck without dramatically changing the arbitration pro­
cedures or making them less efficient. 
The third argument against arbitration-that the informality of 
the proceedings makes it difficult to have judicial supervision of 
181. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 179, § 21. 
182. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 179, § 18. If the adjournment is granted, 
the requesting party is to be charged a fee, not to exceed $100, but the arbitrators may 
waive the fee. [d. 
183. Thus, for example, if a document is not voluntarily produced the arbitrators may 
subpoena a person to bring the document to the hearing, 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1982), and, since a 
full review of the document has not been had before the hearing, matters relating to that 
document may be pursued at a subsequent hearing. See SOMMER, supra note 9, § 
118.05[9). While the power to subpoena is limited to hearings, the arbitrator may ask the 
parties to agree to pre-hearing disclosure. Willen ken, supra note 179, at 182. 
184. SOMMER, supra note 9, § 118.01. At least one district court, in concluding that arbi­
tration rights had not been waived, has suggested that because rules concerning discovery 
in arbitration are flexible, they might result in the same type of discovery which had taken 
place in federal court. Brener v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442,452 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985). The abuse of discovery in the federal courts is well documented. E.g., Brazil, The 
Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposal for Change, 31 VAND. L. 
REV. 1295, 1320-331 (1978); Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the 
New Federal Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 680, 
696-98 (1983). 
185. Burrough, Exchanges Mull Changing Rules for Arbitration, Wall St. J., July 24, 
1987, at 19, col. 2; see infra note 211. 
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the decision-making process-arises both because of the lack of a 
record of the proceedings, and because an arbitrator's decision 
does not necessarily include the reasons for that decision.188 
These absences can create a situation in which it is difficult or 
impossible for a court to review the propriety of the arbitrator's 
decision.187 The Uniform Code of Arbitration does provide some 
protection against these problems. For example, while no record 
of the arbitration proceedings is ordinarily kept, any party may 
request a verbatim record, and the requesting party or parties 
must bear the expense of that transcript.188 For an arbitration in­
volving a significant sum of money or multiple hearings, the par­
ties are likely to want such a record in any event.189 While the 
availability of this option may solve the problem, the SEC should 
mandate that a written record of every arbitration proceeding 
must be kept, the cost of which will be paid either by the losing 
party or by the brokerage firm defending the· action, which has 
the resources and an institutional interest in insuring an accept­
able arbitration process. 
A more fundamental problem is that, while the award must be 
in writing,190 the arbitrator cannot be required to state the rea­
sons for the award, and as a general rule is not encouraged to do 
SO.191 In addition, there is limited judicial review of the arbitra­
186. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) ("As [the arbitrators') award may be made 
without explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings, 
the arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of ... statutory requirements ... cannot 
be examined."). Justice Blackmun emphasized this point in his dissent in McMahon when 
he stated that records of proceedings are not invariably kept and that arbitrators are "not 
bound by precedent" and are advised not to give reasons for their decisions. McMahon, 
107 S. Ct. at 2354 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
187. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436. The position of some advocates of arbitration is that a lack 
of judicial review is fully appropriate since the parties have agreed to binding arbitration 
and, to make the system work, the parties must live with "[a)n occasional mistake by an 
arbitrator." R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT You NEED To KNOW 25 (3d ed. 
1986). The McMahon Court was not willing to go so far, and cited Mitsubishi Motors as 
reserving the question of whether claimants have the capacity to reinstate a federal court 
action if an arbitrator fails "to take cognizance of the statutory cause of action." McMa­
hon, 107 S. Ct. at 2340 (citing Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 636-37 & n.19); see infra 
note 194. 
188. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 179, § 25. 
189. See SOMMER, supra note 9, § 118.05[13). 
190. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 179, § 29(a). 
191. Courts cannot require arbitrators to give the reasons for their awards. United Steel 
Workers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960); Wilko v. Swan, 346 
U.S. 427, 436 (1953); Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 653 F.2d 310, 312 (7th Cir. 
1981). The general practice of advising a,rbitrators not to give the reasons for their deci­
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tion award. Under the Arbitration Act, an arbitrator's award can 
be vacated if, among other reasons, "the arbitrators exceeded 
their powers, or so imperfectly execute them that a mutual, final, 
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not 
made."192 While courts have read this language narrowly in order 
to limit the review of arbitration awards,193 they have considered 
whether there was a manifest disregard of the law, and whether 
there was a rational basis for the decision.194 This review, how­
sions was pointed out by Justice Blackmun in McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2354 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRA­
TION-WHAT You NEED To KNOW 29 (3d ed. 1986». 
192. 	9 U.S.C. § lO(d) (1982). Section 10 reads in full: 

In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district 

wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the 

application of any party to the arbitration­
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means. 
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or ei­
ther of them. 
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone 
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence perti­
nent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the 
rights of any party have been prejudiced. 
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed 
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted 
was not made. 
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement re­
quired the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, 
direct a rehearing by the arbitrators. 
193. E.g., Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 653 F.2d 310, 312 (7th Cir. 1981); Na­
tional Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Princess Management Co., Ltd., 597 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1979). 
194. E.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 
1986) (citing Wilko as the source of the manifest disregard standard); Storer Broadcasting 
Co. v. American Fed'n of Tel., 600 F.2d 45, 47 (6th Cir. 1979) (rational basis required). 
The exact meaning of the standard of review is somewhat unclear because of the gener­
alities of the statements courts make in rendering their decisions. Professor David A. Lip­
ton has suggested that there is uncertainty among arbitrators about whether "manifest 
disregard" means that arbitrators must apply applicable legal standards, or whether they 
can use their "commercial judgment, a sense of equity, and/or common sense as a basis for 
resolving the dispute." Lipton, The Standard on Which Arbitrators Base Their Decisions: 
The SROs Must Decide, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 6 (1988). Professor Lipton suggests that this 
has not been sufficiently addressed by the SRO's because the system was not set up to 
deal with complex cases, and now that it is faced with such cases it must directly address 
the issue. [d. at 5. It is clear, however, that the Supreme Court's view is that arbitrators 
are to apply the applicable legal standards in rendering their decisions, and that this is an 
underlying basis for the Court's series of decisions which have moved away from Wilko's 
distrust of arbitration. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338-41. As the court has stated: "Finally, 
we have indicated that there is no reason to assume at the outset that arbitration will not 
follow the law; although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such 
review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the stat­
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ever, is of little benefit if the arbitrator has not provided the rea­
sons for the decision. The purpose in not providing reasons for 
the decision and in narrowly limiting judicial review is to stream­
line the proceedings by reaching final results without a lengthy 
appeals process. 1911 While such a purpose is certainly valid, it must 
be balanced against legitimate concerns for investor protection 
under the securities laws. In order to insure this protection, and 
to provide a system which permits investors to have confidence in 
the arbitrator's decision, it would be appropriate for the SEC to 
exercise its supervisory power over the arbitration process to 
strike a balance between the competing interests involved. It 
should mandate that the arbitrators state the reasons for the de­
cision so that the parties and a reviewing court will be able to 
assess, in a manner consistent with the Arbitration Act, whether 
there was a disregard of the law, and whether there was a rational 
basis for the decision.196 Such a change would permit an openness 
that will encourage better decision-making and confidence in the 
arbitral process. It should be recognized that as a result, there 
will be some loss in efficiency since arbitrators will have to pre­
pare a written explanation of the reasons for their decisions, and 
the availability of such a written record will make it easier to 
raise challenges on appeal. This loss in efficiency, however, is an 
appropriate price to pay since the arbitration process is being 
used to resolve claims establishing federally created protections 
for the investing public. 
The fourth argument against arbitration is that the system is 
controlled by the securities industry, albeit under SEC supervi­
ute." [d. at 2340; Wilko, 346 U.S. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Arbitrators may 
not disregard the law .... On this we all agree."). 
195. See National Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Princess Management Co., Ltd., 597 F.2d at 
825. 
196. See supra text accompanying notes 46, 47 & 51. Courts have recognized the need 
for arbitration awards to be explained in order to to insure adequate judicial review. E.g., 
Sargent v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 920, 922·23 (D.D.C. 1987) 
(vacating an award and remanding to the arbitration panel for an explanation of their 
award, so that the court could "engage in meaningful judicial review of the plaintiffs 
award"). 
One provision of a bill introduced in Congress to reform the securities arbitration sys­
tem would require arbitrators to state briefly, in writing, the reasons for the decision, and 
the elements of the award. H.R. 4960, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); [July-Dec.) Sec. Reg. 
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1054 (July 8, 1988). 
In the analogous field of labor arbitration, written decisions stating the reasons for the 
award are common, and there is strong support for this practice. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, 
How ARBITRATION WORKS 281 (4th ed. 1985). 
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sion, and that such control operates to the disadvantage of the 
investor.197 The legitimacy of this concern is unclear. The securi­
ties fraud claims involved are not cases that question the underly­
ing financial structure of the industry; they usually consist of in­
dividual cases claiming misconduct on a limited scale, such as an 
individual investor whose life savings has been lost by alleged 
misconduct. Arguably, the securities industry has a strong inter­
est in rooting out this misconduct as part of its self-regulating 
process. Moreover, the investors benefit by having knowledgeable 
arbitrators resolve securities law claims because the arbitrator's 
expertise in the securities area will allow for speedier and more 
expert resolutions of these cases. 
Notwithstanding this argument, it is true that investors, or at 
least investors' attorneys, are concerned about the propriety of 
the securities industry's control of the arbitration process.198 The 
basis for this concern is difficult to ascertain. It may be that arbi­
trators with a connection to the industry may be perceived as less 
sympathetic to investors than a judge who only sees these matters 
occasionally, and so may be perceived as more "objective." There 
may also be a concern that a connection to the industry may 
cause arbitrators to have a "there but for the grace of God go I" 
attitude towards the claims of investors. While these may be le­
gitimate concerns, the limited statistical evidence available is at 
best inconclusive as to whether the percentage of successful liti­
gants and the size of the awards accurately reflects the amount of 
harm incurred.199 To the extent, however, that there exists a lack 
of public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the pro­
cess, difficulties will arise with respect to the effective use of arbi­
197. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2355-56 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
198. As Justice Blackmun stated in his opinion in McMahon: "The uniform opposition 
of investors to compelled arbitration and the overwhelming support of the securities in­
dustry for the process suggest that there must be some truth to the investors' belief that 
the securities industry has an advantage in a forum under its own control." [d. at 2355. 
199. In its amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court in McMahon, the American Arbi­
tration Association cited statistics on the fairness of arbitration. It stated that in the cases 
surveyed the claimant was successful in 68% of the cases with an average award of 
$26,000, and punitive damages were awarded in four cases. Brief for American Arbitration 
Association as Amicus Curiae at 17. Of course such statistics are of limited value since 
they do not tell us whether the parties thought the resolutions were fair and accurately 
reflected what had happened in the cases. [d. at 2355-56 n.20 (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). Moreover, as long as arbitrators are free to decide cases with­
out explaining their decisions, it will be difficult to assess this concern. 
585 1989] ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION 
tration in the resolution of securities fraud cases.200 
While some of this difficulty may be solved by a more open 
process of decision-making,201 confidence in the system will ulti­
mately depend on confidence in the impartiality of the decision­
makers. In order to achieve this goal arbitrators must be viewed 
as being independent of the industry. The Uniform Code of Arbi­
tration has attempted to deal with this by requiring that a major­
ity of an arbitration panel "not be from the securities indus­
try."202 The individuals who will serve as arbitrators are selected 
by the Director of Arbitration of the sponsoring organization.203 
The Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration has set out 
guidelines for the classification of persons as "public arbitrators." 
Those guidelines state: 
No one may serve as a public arbitrator who has been an em­
ployee or partner of a member organization or subsidiary 
thereof, or a shareholder of a non-publicly owned member or­
ganization or subsidiary thereof for a period of three years im­
mediately preceding his or her appointment as a public 
arbitrator. 
Additional information concerning a particular arbitrator may 
be obtained by a party or the party's attorney upon request di­
rected to the Director of Arbitration prior to the commencement 
of the hearing or a submission to the arbitrator without a 
hearing.204 
In addition, each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge, 
and an unlimited number of challenges for cause.2011 
While these provisions should help to encourage public confi­
dence, they do not fully solve the problem. The definition of a 
public arbitrator is broadly drawn, and may lead to some persons 
being qualified as "public" who have significant ties to the securi­
200. Kat3oris, supra note 19, at 310. 
201. See supra text accompanying notes 185-95. 
202. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 179, § 8(a). Claims for under $500,000 are 
to be heard by panels of three to five arbitrators, and claims over $500,000 are to have 
panels of five arbitrators, unless the parties agree in writing to have panels of three arbi­
trators. In both cases a majority of the panel are not to be from the securities industry 
unless otherwise requested by the public customer. Id. For claims under $5,000, there is a 
voluntary option to use a simplified arbitration procedure with a single arbitrator who is 
to be from the public, if possible, and otherwise from the securities industry. Fifth Report, 
supra note 179, Exhibit D [Simplified Arbitration]. 
203. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 179, § 8(b). 
204. Fifth Report, supra note 179, Exhibit B at 17. 
205. Uniform Code of Arbitration, supra note 179, § 10. 
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ties industry. For example, in McMahon, Justice Blackmun 
pointed out that this definition would permit attorneys for ex­
change members or for SRO's to serve as public arbitrators, 
which in his view is unsatisfactory.208 While due regard must be 
given to insure that the panel considering the question has the 
requisite expertise, the definition of public arbitrator should be 
narrowed to encourage public confidence.207 In addition, the Di­
rector of Arbitration should be sensitive to any appearance of a 
lack of impartiality in the persons selected for a pane1.208 Beyond 
this, however, the arbitration code should be amended to require 
that detailed information as to the background of each arbitrator 
must be provided as a matter of course prior to the arbitration.209 
A short waiting period should be created to enable the Director of 
Arbitration of the sponsoring organization to resolve any ques­
tions or challenges concerning the arbitrators. 
In addition, SRO's should be required to prepare periodic re­
ports on the selection process. These reports should be filed with 
the SEC and made available to the public.21o The disclosure of 
this type of information will help develop the public confidence in 
arbitration which is needed to establish the arbitration of securi­
ties law claims as an appropriate method of dispute resolution. 
The reports will also provide the SEC with a formal reporting 
system to monitor the arbitration process in order to determine 
whether it is operating fairly, and if it is not, what additional 
steps should be taken to insure impartial decision-making.211 If 
206. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2355 (citing to Panel of Arbitrators 1987-1988, 1987 Amer­
ican Stock Exchange Guide (CCH) at 159-60, which indicated that 53 out of 70 "public" 
arbitrators are lawyers). 
207. Katsoris, supra note 19, at 311 (arguing that SICA's definition of a "public arbitra­
tor" had taken these competing interests into consideration). The New York Stock Ex­
change has revised its guidelines for public arbitrators to eliminate from the definition 
professionals who represent the industry, or those who spent a substantial part of their 
business careers in the industry. Also, close family ties with broker-dealers will be grounds 
for a challenge for cause. [Jan.-June) Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.9, at 325 (Mar. 4, 
1988). 
208. Katsoris, supra note 19, at 311-12. 
209. The New York Stock Exchange has begun providing biographical information on 
arbitrators to assist with peremptory challenges. [Jan.-June) Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
No.9, at 325 (Mar. 4, 1988). 
210. These reports should include information concerning the background of "public" 
arbitrators that are selected; challenges that have been made; the resolution of the chal­
lenges; and other appropriate information. 
211. The SEC is reviewing the arbitration process with the goal of revising the rules to 
make arbitration more effective. The SEC's Division of Market Regulation has sent to 
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adopted, these procedures will result in a formal, structured pro­
cess which will give investors greater confidence in the system, 
while encouraging a careful analysis in the selection process. 
B. The Wilko Rule 
A second question left open by the McMahon decision, which 
the Supreme Court has recently agreed to consider,212 is whether 
the Wilko rule will continue to operate in the area of claims 
under section 12(2) of the Securities Act. Although the majority 
avoided this question since a section 12(2) claim was not before 
the Court, the Court noted that "stare decisis concerns may 
counsel against upsetting Wilko's contrary conclusion under the 
Securities Act."213 The Court's statement that stare decisis 
"may" protect Wilko suggests a willingness to consider the ques­
tion. Moreover, application of the Court's reasoning in McMahon 
with respect to Rule 10b-5 claims should lead to the same conclu­
sion with respect to section 12(2) claims. The basis for the Court's 
analysis in McMahon was its interpretation that Wilko provides 
only that the anti-waiver provision of the statute prohibits waiver 
of a judicial forum where arbitration is an inadequate process for 
protecting the statutory rights involved.214 Since the Court in Mc­
Mahon concluded that arbitration was adequate to deal with Rule 
10b-5 claims, it should also be adequate to deal with section 12(2) 
claims. Arbitration, therefore, should not be prohibited by the 
SICA a staff letter, approved by the Commission, which made a number of recommenda­
tions for consideration by the member SRO's. Among the recommendations were: (1) es­
tablishing a more restrictive definition of "public arbitrator"; (2) having SRO's publish 
summary data concerning the results of arbitration; (3) developing the discovery process 
more fully, especially in large cases, and allowing for depositions when witnesses are un­
available; (4) having greater disclosure by arbitrators of their personal and professional 
relationships, and making this available to the parties; (5) establishing an arbitrator edu­
cation program; (6) considering special rules for large and complex cases, which might 
include written opinions in some cases; (7) increasing the choice of arbitration forums in 
agreements since most currently provide for New York Stock Exchange or National Asso­
ciation of Securities Dealers sponsored arbitration; and (8) considering other sponsoring 
groups, such as the American Arbitration Association, for handling these arbitrations. 
These recommendations will now be considered by the SRO's which will work with the 
SEC to consider all possible options before revisions to the process are made. [July-Dec.) 
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1387-88 (Sept. 18, 1987). 
212. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir.), cert. 
granted sub nom. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 57 U.S.L.W. 
3343 (Nov. 15, 1988). 
213. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2341. 
214. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52. 
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anti-waiver provision of the Securities Act, unless there is some 
significant difference between the two claims for purposes of arbi­
tration. As previously discussed, these provisions are not distin­
guishable for purposes of arbitration.2lI! The fact that the McMa­
hon Court chose to ignore the "colorable argument" for 
differentiating these types of claims further supports this 
position.216 
Thus, in reexamining Wilko, the Court should conclude that 
section 12(2) claims are subject to pre-dispute arbitration agree­
ments. This result is necessary as a matter of consistency, and 
because the reasoning of its recent decisions suggests that these 
claims would be better handled by arbitration, provided that the 
SEC appropriately regulates the process.217 In fact, Justice Black­
mun's opinion in McMahon flatly stated that the Court's decision 
"effectively overrules Wilko,"218 and since McMahon, courts have 
divided on the question of the continued vitality of Wilko. The 
courts which have concluded that claims under the Securities Act 
are not arbitrable have relied on the argument that McMahon 
chose not to overrule Wilko, and therefore it should continue to 
apply.219 On the other hand, a number of courts have concluded 
215. See supra text accompanying notes 120-41. 
216. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43. 
217. In his dissent, Justice Stevens expressed concern about the majority's overturning 
such a long line of precedents denying arbitration. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2359 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (citing Justice Black's dissent in Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 
U.S. 235, 257-58 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting)). The basis for concluding that Wilko should 
be reconsidered, is that the underlying considerations which motivated that result are no 
longer present, and therefore arbitration agreements relating to these claims should be 
enforced. 
218. [d. at 2346; see infra notes 219-20. In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens was con­
cerned that the long standing application of Wilko to the Exchange Act created a pre­
sumption of interpretation that should be dealt with by the legislature and not the courts. 
[d. at 2359-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
219. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit came to this conclusion by 
merely stating that McMahon questioned, but did not overrule Wilko. Chang v. Lin, 824 
F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 1987); McCowan v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 741, 
744 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (since Wilko had not been overruled, Securities Act claims would not 
be sent to arbitration); Continental Servo Life & Health Ins. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 664 
F. Supp. 997, 1001 (M.D. La. 1987) (while Wilko has been questioned, it has not been 
overruled, so Securities Act claims would not be sent to arbitration); Johnson V. O'Brien, 
420 N.W.2d 264, 267-68 (Minn. App. 1988) (a divided three-judge panel said that Wilko 
had been questioned, but not overruled). 
The same result was reached by a district court in Schultz V. Robinson-Humphrey/ 
American Express, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 219 (M.D. Ga. 1987), but with a more detailed analy­
sis. That court also relied on the fact that McMahon had not overruled Wilko, but ac­
knowledged that the Supreme Court may have wanted to avoid giving an advisory opinion. 
-
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that the McMahon decision has "so undercut" the Wilko analysis 
that it was proper to order a section 12(2) claim to arbitration.220 
In light of this movement away from Wilko, it is legitimate to 
ask whether plaintiff-investors would be better served by arbi­
trating their section 12(2) claims. It has already been pointed out 
that a plaintiff will be placed at a disadvantage by having to pro­
ceed in two forums, judicial and arbitral, if some claims remain in 
[d. at 220. However, it gave weight to two other factors in distinguishing the cases. First, it 
referred to the legislative history of the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act, see supra 
text accompanying notes 110-14, and stated that the McMahon Court concluded that this 
showed a clearer legislative intent to affirm Wilko's ruling as to section 12(2) claims, than 
it did as to Rule 10b-5 claims. [d. While this may appear to be a legitimate position, its 
weakness lies in the fact that the McMahon Court recognized that this legislative history 
was unclear as to what Congress thought existing law was. See supra note 155. For exam­
ple, since the Supreme Court concluded that Wilko only prohibited arbitration where arbi­
tration was inadequate, then Congress's support for Wilko would only bring us back to the 
question of the adequacy of arbitration. See supra text accompanying notes 149-54. Sec­
ond, the Schultz court asserted that the Supreme Court had not specifically rejected the 
"colorable argument" for differentiating between Securities and Exchange Act claims, and 
so Wilko should be followed until it is specifically overruled. Schultz, 666 F. Supp. at 220. 
The weaknesses in the "colorable argument" which make it unhelpful in analyzing this 
problem have been discussed. See supra text accompanying notes 120-41. The same rea­
soning used by the Schultz court was also used by.another district court in Ketchum v. 
Almahurst Bloodstock IV, Nos. 86-2498, 86-2523, 86-2535 (D. Kan. Feb. 12, 1988) 
(WESTLAW, 1988 WL 42552). 
220. In Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir.), 
cert. granted sub nom. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 57 
U.S.L.W. 3343 (Nov. 15, 1988), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that 
section 12(2) claims were arbitrable. In its view, McMahon had completely undermined 
Wilko since it limited that case to situations where arbitration was inadequate to protect 
substantive rights, and concluded that arbitration was adequate for Exchange Act claims. 
[d. at 1298-99. In the Fifth Circuit's view, the similarities between the Securities Act and 
the Exchange Act justified the conclusion that it should follow McMahon "which lead[s) 
directly to the obsolescence of Wilko and the arbitrability of Securities Act § 12(2) 
claims." [d. at 1299. Moreover, the court rejected the argument that the legislative history 
to the 1975 amendments meant that Congress intended that section 12(2) claims were 
non-arbitrable. It found "implausible" the view that the two statutes were to be treated 
differently, and instead thought McMahon viewed the legislative history as leaving the 
Wilko issue to the courts. [d. & n.7. Similar reasoning has been used by a number of other 
courts in deciding to permit arbitration of Securities Act claims. Ryan v. Liss, Tenner & 
Goldberg Securities Corp., 683 F. Supp. 480 (D.N.J. 1988) (claim under section 17(a) of 
the Securities Act sent to arbitration); Staiman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1009 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Aronson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 675 F. 
Supp. 1324 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Rocz v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 743 P.2d 971 (Ariz. 
App. 1987) (section 17(a) claim ruled arbitrable). 
In another case decided by the Fifth Circuit which gave the McMahon decision retroac­
tive effect, the court, in dicta, commented on Wilko, stating: "McMahon undercuts every 
aspect of Wilko v. Swan; a formal overruling of Wilko appears inevitable-or, perhaps, 
superfluous." Noble v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 823 F.2d 849, 850 n.3 (5th Cir. 
1987) (citation omitted). 
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federal court, while others are sent to arbitration.221 In many 
cases this will result in the plaintiff being burdened with addi­
tional time and expense of simultaneously challenging a large cor­
porate defendant on two different fronts, or having the federal 
court proceedings delayed until the arbitration is resolved. When 
the disadvantage of proceeding in two forums is coupled with the 
reality that the arbitration is a quicker and less expensive method 
of proceeding, little benefit accrues to plaintiffs' opposition to ar­
bitration of their section 12(2) claims. This, of course, assumes 
that adjustments are made to the arbitration process as have 
been suggested earlier. The only factors that can be weighed in 
favor of retaining section 12(2) claims in federal court is the po­
tential "discovery" benefits in preparation of a case, and the hope 
that a judicial forum will be more sympathetic to the investor's 
claim. These benefits are hypothetical at best, and do not justify 
a plaintiffs decision to litigate a section 12(2) claim, when arbi­
tration is available, and will nonetheless be utilized to resolve the 
other claims between the parties. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has shown an increasing willingness in re­
cent years to rely on the arbitral process for the resolution of se­
curities disputes, and has been more willing to enforce pre-dis­
pute arbitration agreements under the Arbitration Act. In so 
doing the Court has assumed that the process is more capable of 
dealing with these matters than it once was, and that SEC super­
vision of the rules of arbitration will insure the satisfactory use of 
this system in dealing with claims under the Exchange Act. As a 
result of these developments, it is important that the SEC care­
fully review the legitimate concerns of the public investor, and 
direct changes in the system that will increase public confidence. 
Assuming that this is done, there are substantial reasons for the 
Court to also enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements with re­
gard to claims which arise under the Securities Act. 
221. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75. 
